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Private Problem, Public Solution: 
Affirmative Action in the 21st Century 
by 
Darlene C. Goring• 
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact. . . .  The unhappy persi stence of both the practice 
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority 
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is 
not disqualified from acting in response to it.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At some point during the ninety-nine years between the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 2 and its decision in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 3 the concepts o f  race, color and ethnicity were 
eradicated as constitutionally relevant factors in the Equal Protection paradigm, or 
so the argument goes.4  Clearly, immutable characteristics such as race, color and · 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.B.A., Howard 
University; J .D. and L.L.M., Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Leonard S. Rubinowitz for his continued support and encouragement. I would also like to 
thank Mark T. Hurst and Carol Parris for their valuable research assistance. 
1 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)(0'Connor, J.). 
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200. 
4 See generally Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the 
Struggle Against Racial Oppression, 62 UMKC L.REv. 651 ( 1994 ). In this article Professor 
Scott argues that the Supreme Court's color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause "perpetuates a concept of racial justice that is defined by the dominant, not the 
outside, group and leads to the continued racial oppression of African-Americans." Id. at 
668. He similarly argues that a race-neutral constitutional paradigm is both judicially and 
socially misleading. He notes that: 
The strategy of color blindness is being questioned as is the 
assumption that a color-blind society will be the equivalent of a racially 
equal and just society. Those professing color-blindness confuse the 
recognition of race, and the difference that race makes, with racism. 
There is an increased rejection of the concept that to recognize race is the 
equivalent of being a racist. This presumption is being stood on its head 
by outsiders and whites who have begun to listen to the stories of 
209 
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ethnicity continue to play important roles not only in the American jurisprudential 
landscape, but in all facets of American society . How_eve�, th� con�ept o f  _a �olo_
r­
blind society ,5 as first articulated by Justice Harlan m his d1ssentmg opm1on m 
Plessy, 6 has become a popular justification for attacking remedial efforts that seek 
outsiders; we posit that not to recognize and acknowledge race is to deny 
the positive value of being African-America n  or non-white. 
Race-consciousness rejects the assimilationist model inherent to 
color-blindness and instead argues for acculturation and recognition of the 
value of being racially different. It treats difference respectfully and 
recognizes that race plays a critical role in developing perspectives. It 
advocates the telling of outsider narratives by the oppressed group and the 
hearing of these stories by the privileged group. It suggests that our 
societal goal should not necessarily be to move beyond race but instead 
to come to value the difference that race makes. 
Id. at 693-94. 
5 For a discussion of the m erits of the color-blind constitution see generally, Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1 998, § 
6 (Magazine) at 42. 
Id. 
More recently, however, a majority has edged toward pronouncing the 
Constitution "color blind," coming close to holding legislation that uses 
any racial classification unconstitutional. Reading the Equal Protection 
Clause to protect w hites as well as blacks from racial classification is to 
focus upon a situation that does not and never has existed in our society. 
Unfortunately, it casts doubt upon all forms of racial classification, 
however benign and however focused upon promoting integration. If 
such a reading is finally adopted by a majority of the Court, it would put 
a constitutional pall over all governmental affirmative action programs 
and even put similar private programs in danger of being labeled 
"discriminatory" a gainst whites and therefore in violation of existing civil 
rights legislation - perhaps the ultimate stupidity. 
But see Marquez Lundin, The Call for a Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 
407 ( 1 997). Marquez rejects the use of the strict scrutiny analysis to determine the 
constitutional validity of race-based preferences, and i nstead argues that "governmental race­
based action should always be impermissible." Id. at 408. He notes that: 
A color-blind law will not only heal our racial divide, it is also the surest 
protection for the rights of all minority groups. One need look no further 
than Korematsu to see that as long as race can be used at all, it can b e  
used for ill. It i s  tragic that the search for racial equality has turned into 
a battle �or racial classification and the division of rights and benefits on 
that baSIS. 
Id. at 456. 
� See Pless�-, 163 U.S. at 5 59. 
But in view of the constitution in the eye of the Jaw th · · h" ' , ere ts m t 1s 
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to eliminate the continuing effects of discrimination on racial and ethnic minority 
groups.7 
Although the concept of race neutrality is implicit in the Court's 
interpretation of a color-blind constitution, it does not mean however, that race or 
ethnicity cannot be used as a constitutionally permissible criterion in the allocation 
of resources8. On the contrary, it means that if used, race-based classifications must 
Id. 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste 
here. Our c onstitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law. 
7 See generally Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., et, 32 F. Supp.2d 1370 (S.D. 
Ga. 1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, et al., 183 F.R.D .  209 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Gruttcr v. 
Bollinger, 16 F. Supp.2d 797 (E.D Mich. 1998); Smith v. University of Washington Law 
School, 2F. Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 
1994); Hopwood v. State of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); DeRondc v. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981); Regents of University of Cal. v. Bak.kc, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See also Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & 
Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine) 
at 42: 
Id. 
Affirmative action programs, whether to avoid present bias or to remedy 
the effects of three centuries of discrimination against African-Americans, 
are race-based. The problems they seek to cure are and have been racc­
based. They stem from history-the political, economic and social 
domination of blacks by a white majority that regarded blacks as inferior. 
Undoubtedly there are blacks who are biased against whites and who, 
given the power to do so, would discriminate against them. Of course, 
given the power, it would be as morally wrong for them to do so as it has 
been for whites. But discrimination by blacks against whites is not 
America's problem. It is not the problem that predominantly white 
legislatures, businesses and universities seek to solve through affirmative 
action programs. 
8 The modem origin of a color-blind society can be traced to the "I Have a Dream" speech 
delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr on August 28, 1963 at the Lincoln Memorial in 
Washington, D.C. He stated that "I have a dream that my four little children will one day 
live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but the content of 
their character." DEBORAH GILLAN STRAUB, AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES 211 ( 1996). Dr. 
King's words continue to resonate throughout American society, but the color-blind society 
envisioned by Dr. King could not have included a nation where the vestiges of racial 
discrimination were eliminated without a simultaneous recognition of the impact that racial 
discrimination had on the African American society. 
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be able to withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny that is the cornerstone of the 
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
_ ?
f the
_ 
�ourteenth 
Amendment.9 This analytical paradigm requires an m1t1al fmdmg of a 
constitutionally compelling justification for the use of the race-based criterion. 
Supreme Court case law is clear - the goal of eliminating discrimination or 
remedying the present effects of past discriminatory practices can serve as a 
compelling justification for the use of race-based classifications. '0 Proof of broad 
societal discrimination will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Additionally, the 
discriminatory conduct must have been performed by the party implementing the 
race-based remedy. Strict scrutiny also mandates that the race-based remedy be 
narrowly tailored to address the harm resultant from such past discriminatory 
conduct. 
Notwithstanding the scope and breadth of conflicting views generated by 
this paradigm, the Court has clearly embraced this racially neutral interpretation of 
the strict scrutiny test, and incorporated it into the Equal Protection paradigm. The 
goal of this Article is not to enter into that debate, but to work within the analytical 
parameters currently established by the Court to address unresolved issues. For 
example, is the racially neutral interpretation of the strict scrutiny test so strict that· 
most, if not all, race-based criteria will be stricken? If so, is the Court willing to 
recognize a broader range of constitutionally permissible justifications for the use 
of race-based classifications?11 This Article embraces the Court's color-blind 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as the standard against which race­
based affirmative action preferences will be measured, and proposes strategies 
aimed at satisfying this heightened constitutional standard. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ,§ 1. 
N� state s?�ll mak�
_
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or unmumhes of c1t1zens of the United States; n or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 10 Pursuant to Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke 438 
U.S. 265 an unresolved question remains regarding the continued permissibility of divdrsity �1S a compelling justification for the use of race-based .criteria. Id. 
See Wygant v. J�ckson B�. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor J., concurring) 
And 
_
c��amly nothmg the Court has said today necessarily forecloses the 
poss1b1hty that the Court will find other governmental interests which 
have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have not been passed on here to �e sufficiently "important" or "compelling" to sustain the use 
of affirmative action policies. 
Id. 
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The Court's racially neutral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has given opponents of race-based preferences significant ammunition in their 
efforts to eliminate affirmative action programs. Although the attack on race-based 
affirmative action has occurred on many fronts, this Article will foc us on the field 
on higher education.12 Recent judicial and legislative attacks on race-based 
affirmative action preferences by colleges and universities across the country are 
beginning to take their toll. During the past few years, there has been a tremendous 
decrease in the number of racial and ethnic minority students enrolling in and 
successfully completing college and professional schools. 13 In addition, the 
12 Also note that others have limited their analysis of affirmative action programs to the field 
of higher education. See generally, WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE 
RIYER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE A ND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS xxv (1998). 
Id. 
This study is limited in several important respects. First, we are 
concerned solely with higher education. In our view, one problem with 
much of the debate over affinnati ve action is that it lumps together a large 
number of highly disparate areas and programs, ranging from the 
awarding of contracts to minority-owned businesses to policies governing 
hiring and promotion to the admissions policies of colleges and 
universities. The arguments that pertain to one area may or may not apply 
in other areas. It is noteworthy, for example, that the plaintiffs in the 
Piscataway case, which centered on the layoff of a white secondary 
school teacher, took pains in their final brief to ask the Supreme Court not 
to confuse the job-specific issues that confronted the plaintiff with the 
much broader, and rather different, sets of considerations that face 
educational institutions in deciding whom to admit. 
13 See generally, The Declining Enrollments of Blacks in Schools of Architecture, 23 J. 
BLACKS HIGHER ED. 35 (1999);AdamCohen/lrvine, "When the Field is Level in California, 
Minority Students are "Cascading out of Top Schools and into the Second Tier. Is This 
Good For Them?", TIME, July 5, 1999, at 30; Nancy Cantor, Affirmative Action: What 
Michigan can really learn from California, Opinion, Det. News, May 17, 1999, at AJO; 
Black Enrollments Drop at Harvard Law School, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 135 (1999); 
Minority Entrants to California Med Schools Down 32 Percent, MED. & HEALTH, Apr. 26, 
1999, available in 1999 WL 10391837; Kenneth R. Weiss, Minority Admissions at UC 
Almost at 1997 Level Education: Sharp Drop had followed end of affirmative action last 
year. Top campuses have notfally rebounded, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999, at Al; Kenneth 
R. Weiss, UC Board Expected to Ok Davis Plan to Admit Top 4% Education: Another 3,600 
students a year would be eligible to attend. Davis has said minority enrollment would 
increase, but officials say impact would be minimal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999 at A l ;  
Karen Brown, Students protest UM ass shift on admissions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1999, 
atB2; Mary Ann Roser, College Admission law has mixed results, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, 
Dec. 28, 1998, at A 1; Jayne Noble Subler, Minority enrollment increases at Texas 
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challenge to race-based affirmative action programs is being systematically 
spearheaded by well-funded, conservative public in�erest 
. 
groups who are 
underwriting legal efforts to eliminate race-based affirmative action programs from 
the landscape of the American college and university system.14 In response to these 
well organized legal and political challenges to affirmative action, this Article 
attempts to re-introduce an important player into the equation - the federal 
government. In an area as vital to the political and social advancement of racial and 
ethnic minorities as education, we must shift our emphasis from fighting in di vi dual 
battles to preserve these programs, and instead look to Congress for remedial 
measures that seek to eradicate a problem that is of national importance.15 
universities But schools still show diversity disparities, state report says, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Oct. 23, 1998, at lA; Linda Wertheimer & Claudio Sanchez, The growth in the 
number of blacks, Latinos and other minorities at U.S. colleges and universities has been 
declining for nearly a decade. A new report released today says that lower academic 
achievement and graduation rates from high school are partly responsible. The study a lso 
concludes that the roll back in Affirmative Action in some states is having a chilling effect 
across the nation, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Sept. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3646569; 
Kenneth Weiss, Fewer Blacks and Latinos Enroll at UC Education: Declines are sharpest 
at top campuses, while numbers increase at Irvine, Riverside and Santa Cruz, L.A. TIMES, 
May 21, 1998, at A3. 
14 At the forefront of the battle challenging race-based affinnative action programs is The 
Center for Individual Rights ("CIR"). CIR is a non-for-p rofit public interest law firm that 
draws support from a number of attorneys who work for CIR on a pro bono basis. The 
mission of this law firm is to defend "individual rights, with particular emphasis on civil 
rights, freedom of speech, the free exercise of religion, and sexual harassment law. CIR 
provides free legal representation to deserving clients who cannot otherwise obtain or afford 
legal counsel and whose individual rights are threatened." CIR (last modified Sept. 9, 1999) 
<http://www.cir-usa.org/rnission.htm>. 
For a c ritical evaluation of the goals of this organization, see Theodore Cross, African­
American Opportunities in Higher Education: What Are the Racial Goals for The Center 
for Individual Rights?, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 94 (1999). 
15. See Dr. A'lclia Robinson He�, Perpe�uating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the 
Dilemma of Black Access to Pu blic and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47 (1998). 
In the time since the Brown decision called upon the states to dismantle 
their segregationist systems of public and higher education, the 
educational gains of African Americans have been nothing short of 
monumental. In 1994, African Americans received more undergraduate 
and graduate degrees than at any time history, and most of these 
individuals were the prod�cts of TWis. The 1Wis are now the major 
producers of black professionals and doctorates. In 1994, approximate! 
834,000 African Americans were enrolled in 4-year undergraduat� 
institutions, and 615,000 in community colleges. 111,000 African 
Americans were enrolled in graduate school, which represented a 66 
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This Article will expl ore the origins of the Court's color-blind interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the role that this interpretation plays in the 
development of new barriers against chall enges to race-based affirmative action 
programs. Part II of this Arti cle traces the development and application of the strict 
scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality of both invidious and benign racial 
classifications .  Part III examines Justice Powell's position that racial classifications 
used as remedial measures may overcome the presumption o f  constitutional 
invalidity associated with the use of race-based classifications .  In this context, the 
Court recognizes that the continued impact o f  past and present discriminatory 
practices serves a s  a barrier to the abil ity o f  racial and ethnic minorities to equally 
participate in the American social, political, and economic proces s .  
Part IV of thi s Article focuses on whether the strict scrutiny test may be 
satisfied by implementation of Congressionally mandated race-based remedial 
programs. By distinguishing the appl ication of the strict scrutiny test used to 
evaluate municipal and state remedial efforts from the more deferential standard 
used to evaluate Congressionally mandated programs, I argue that §516 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in concert with the enforcement powers set forth in Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as Title VI), 17 authorizes 
Congress to determine whether discrimination or the effects of past discrimination 
continue to influence the racial and ethnic composition of educational institutions 
within the field of higher education. If convincing proof of discrimination is found, 
Congress may implement remedial race-based programs to increase the number of 
racial and ethnic minority group members within both public and private 
educational institutions that receive federal funding. 
percent increase over the previous dec ade. Over this same period, the 
number of blacks in professional sc hool r ose from I 3,000 to 22,000. In 
the years between years of 1985 and 1993, the number of African 
Americans who rec eived the bachelor 's degrees incr eased by 8 p erc ent, 
and those who received the master 's degree by 42 percent. In 1995, the 
number of doctoral degrees awarded to Afric an Amer icans reached an 
all-time high, rising 17 percent over the previous year, from 1095 to 
1 ,287. 
Id. at 62-63. 16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. ("The Congress shall have power t o  enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.") 
17 Ti tle VI of the Civil Right s Act of 1964 provi des that "[n]o person in the United St ates 
shall, on the ground of race, c olor, or national origin, be excluded from p articipation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financ ial assist anc e." 42 U.S.C §2000d (1964). 
216 AKRON LAW REVIEW 
II. THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION -
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST 
[Vol. 33:2 
The guarantees o f  the Equal Protection Clause18 serve as the foundation 
upon which the Court e v aluates the role that racial classifications play in the 
allocation of societal rights and privilege s. 19 Thi s  Clause provides, in pertinent part, 
that " [n]o State shall . . .  deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."20 To effectuate the protections afforded by the rourteenth 
Amendment, the use of race-based classifications, although not expressly 
prohibited, "must be analyzed by a reviewing c ourt under strict scrutiny."21 This 
heightened level of scrutiny did not always e x i s t .  Although the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment represented a signific ant evolution in the legal protection 
afforded initially to African Americans,22 the Supreme Court's initial interpretation 
18 The Supreme Court does not look upon race-based classifications with favor. See Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)("[c]lassifications of citizens solely on the basis or race 
are by their very nature odious to a free people who s e  institutions arc founded upon the 
doctrine of equality.") 
19 See also Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine) at 42. 
Id. 
If problems of race are to be solved, they must be seen as the race-based 
problems they are. It is this aspect of the controversy that recent decision s  
of the Supreme Court have brought into q ue s tion. The Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14lh Amendment was designed to insure that former slaves 
and their descendants were entitled to the same legal protection as white 
citizens. Like the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery and the 15th 
guaranteeing the right to vote regardless o f  race, it was clearly a n d  
unequivocally aimed at racial problems- i n  today's terminology "race 
based." The Equal Protection Clause has never been viewed a s  
preventing classification of citizens for governmental reasons as long as  
the legislative classification was "reasonable" in terms o f  its purpose. 
20 U.S.  CONST. amend. XIV. 
21 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v .  Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Reliance on a strict 
constitutional evaluation of racial classifications originates with language from s 
C · · · H" b 
uprcmc 
ourt opimons m zra ayashi v. U.S., and Korematsu v. U.S.: 
[I]t s�o
.
ul� be noted, t� begin ':ith, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil nghts of a smgle racial group are immediately suspect. That i s  
not to say that al� such restrictions are unco n s titutional. It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressin ubl · . . . . g p IC necesstty may somettmes JUStlfy the existence o f  such restrictio . · 1 . ns,  racia antagomsm never can. 
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1994). 
22 Prior to the ratification o f  the Fourteenth Ame ndment in 186 8, the rights of black 
2000] Pruv ATE PROBLEM, PuBLIC SOLUTION 217 
of these rights was n o t  consistent with the Amendment's facial guarantees of equal 
protection. 
Former Chief Justice Earl Warren c haracterized the Supreme Court's early 
interp retation of the Fourteenth Amendmen t  as flawed and without foresight.23 In 
reflecting on the historic role of the Court, he concluded that: 
the court's fundamental error was in denying Congress a 
meaningful role in Fourteenth Amendment enforcement. The 
Negro faced a variety of barriers - s ome obvious and some quite 
subtle - in his struggle to become a full and equal member of 
American society,  and the federal c o urts were simply not equipped 
to undertake the broad range of programs necessary to tear down 
those barriers . Those courts could proceed only on a case-by-case 
basis in their efforts to relate abstract notions of equality with the 
real world of racial prejudice, discrimination and distrust. The 
judicial conclusion in Plessy v. Ferguson that separation of the 
races satisfied the constitutional command of equality dramatically 
illustrated that abstract judicial concepts will not necessarily reflect 
the real world.24 
Americans, although freed from slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, were 
severely limited. For example, '"[l]iberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment, for which the 
States were to ensure equal protection was, for Black Americans, primarily a freedom from 
slavery and all the common incidents of slavery. Slaves had been denied freedom of 
movement and now, with the Equal Protection Clause, this aspect of liberty was to be 
accorded to Black Americans everywhere in the land." CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE 
INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 254 ( 1997). See also JAMES E. 
BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM (1997); JOSEPH B .  JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984 ). 
23 EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: CEN TENNIAL VOLUME 212 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1970). See also A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE 
AMERICANLEGALPROCESS I I 8 (1996)("Although the Court's erroneous construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevailed for over a half-century, the overwhelming consensus today 
is that Plessy was an untenable statement of the law that set in motion an era of oppression 
from which our nation still has not fully recovered.") 
24 EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212, 225 (Bernard Sch wartz, ed., 1970) 
The remarkable feature of the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment 
decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is that they 
failed to grasp the importance of the nation's commitment to equality and 
the increasingly desperate plight of the Negro. Perhaps this failing is 
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Characterizing the Plessy decision as a judicial example of "fundamental 
error" does not do justice to the six decades of oppressive constitutional 
jurisprudence that it spawned.25 In Plessy26 the Court refused to i
.
nval�d�te s�ate 
legislation that required separate accommodations based on racial d1stmct10n. 
Specifically, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute, passed in 1890, which provided 
for "separate railway carriages for the white and colored races."27 The mere fact 
particularly apparent to us at this period in history when racial problems 
seem to dominate our national life. 
Id. at 224-225. 
25 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment, and 
Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L.REY. 795 (1987). 
The Supreme Court in Plessy placed its imprimatur on state-imposed 
racial segregation and left t o  the "large discretion ... of the legislature" 
the determination whether the state would separate and treat black people 
differently than it did any other group-- majority or minority--in American 
society. In the context of the times, the Court's reference to the 
"established usages, customs and traditions of the people" was nothing 
less than a mandate for states to revert to the past biases, prejudices, and 
d iscrimination that had provided the rationale for slavery and America's 
earlier legitimization of racism--thc very racism that was the target of the 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The majority's thinly 
veiled reversion to a slavery-type jurisprudence, despite its invocation of 
the fourteenth amendment, was revealed by its frequent citations to and 
reliance upon many cases that predated the enactment of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Although many lower courts had explicitly endorsed "Jim Crow 
segregation" prior to Plessy, the significance of the Supreme Court's 
affirmation of the doctrine of 'separate but equal' in 1896 cannot be 
underestimated. The Court's approval was the final and therefore the most 
devastating judicial step in the legitimization of racism under state law. In 
numerous subsequent school cases, state and federal courts continued to 
approve racial discrimination and segregation; most of those courts or 
counsel of record cited or relied upon Plessy as support for expansive 
endorsements of racial subjugation. 
Id. at 805-7. 
26 Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
�7 Plessy, 163 U.S. at540. Plcssy argued that: 
he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens 
of the United States of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took 
possession of a vacant scat in a coach where passengers of the white race 
were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate said 
coach, and take a scat in another, assigned to persons of the colored race 
and. having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected: 
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that the Court permitted Homer Plessy28 to assert a judicial challenge to this statute 
evidenced an evolution in the American legal system's recognition of African 
Americans as citizens of the United States, and therefore entitled them to equal 
application of the privileges and immunities arising therefrom.29 However, equal 
access to the j udicial system did not guarantee equal treatment within its 
boundaries. 
The court viewed the concept of equality as contemplated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Plessy as a way to "enforce the absolute equality of the two races 
before the law,"30 but not, as Justice Brown noted, "to abolish distinctions based 
upon color, or to enforce social , as distinguished from political equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms u nsatisfactory to either."3 1 This ruling 
evidenced an important distinction between legal and social equality that continues 
with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer 
a charge of having violated the above act. 
Id. at 541-42. 
2K Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541. This was not a typical case, but one specifically designed to test 
the constitutionality of this statute. See ELLIS COSE, COWR-BLIND (1997) 
Id. at 17. 
As a test of Louisiana's Separate Car Act, Homer Adolph Plessy provoked 
a prearranged confrontation by sitting in the first-class "white" section of 
a train on the East Louisiana Railway. Plessy's blood was, by his own 
reckoning, only one-eighth "African." And as the Court noted in its 
decision, 'the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him. 
29 Prior to Plessy, Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 3 93 ,  404 (1856) governed the ability of African 
Americans to participate in the American judicial process. ("We think they [African 
Americans] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, 
under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
pri vilegcs which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.") 
See also BRYAN K.  FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY 95 (1997), which discusses the 
continuing impact of the Dred Scott decision. Professor Fair writes that "Taney's opinion 
in Dred Scott was one of the most decisive moments in the nationalization of white 
supremacy in America, as his opinion gave judicial sanction to the commodification and 
subordination of all blacks, whether slave or free, to exclude them from the federal courts. 
This decision shows that the malign racial attitudes of whites toward blacks changed very 
little between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Even today, one sees evidence of 
Taney's beliefs. For example, many whites still live away from blacks as if Blacks were 
unfit to associate with. Many whites continue to enroll their children at schools and 
universities with virtually no black students or teachers. Many whites refuse to support 
black political candidates, especially in statewide or national elections." Id. at 95. 
30 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
31 Id. 
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to permeate all facets of American society.32 This dis tinction also served as t�e 
framework for the 'separate but equal' doctrine that was upheld by the Court m 
32 See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for 
Keeping,-A Time for Throwing Away?," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 77-78, (1998): 
Id. 
In 1896, the Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson, justified segregation by 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as enforcing civil and political 
equality, but not social equality. Faced with legislative and judicial 
commands to equalize civil and political rights, "states seeking to 
disenfranchise African-Americans successively experimented with the 
grandfather clause, residency and literacy requirements, and 'privatization' 
through the white primary, as well as the familiar tactics of racist 
intimidation and discriminatory administration of facially neutral 
registration statutes." Overt race-based distinctions continued to appear 
in the "sphere of so- called social rights" such as "marriage, education, 
public transportation, and accommodation." In fact, b eginning in the 
1880s and "gathering steam after Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, the 
Southern states passed laws that not only authorized exclusion and 
segregation of customers on the basis of race, but in fact required such 
discriminatory practices." Additionally, from about 1890 until 1970, other 
methods of subordinating African-Americans were used including social 
pressure, violence, and other wrongful conduct against these citizens. 
It was not until 1954 that the Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education recognized social equality by striking down the concept of 
segregation as inconsistent with educational equality and declaring that 
the "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy had no place in the 
field of public education. Yet, it took another thirteen years after Brown 
before the Court in Loving v. Virginia definitively "adopted a categorical 
presumption against race-based regulation" by declaring that statutes 
prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Just before the Court decided Loving, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which "ban[s] 
'discrimination or segregation' in the provision of g o ods and services, 
even by private entities, on the basis of 'race, color, religion, or national 
origin,' and outlaw{s] discrimination or segregation in employment 
because of a person's 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" This 
Act was possible because of the civil rights movement and the persistent 
activities of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers from 1954 to 
1964, which kept the issue of racial inequality before the eyes of the 
American public. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not end 
discrimination or racism, it represented an "important statutory 
embodiment of the ideal of racial justice" and helped establish a 
"framework for the resolution of issues of race." 
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Plessy.33 Justice Brown noted that: 
[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places 
where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily 
imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been 
general ly ,  if not universally, recognized as within the competency 
of the state legislatures in the exerci se of their police power.34 
221 
The only l imitation, if you will ,  on the Court's approval of the ' separate but 
33 Charles E. Ross, Symposium: The Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in the Civil Rights Movement, Experience is the Life of the Law, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 
347, 350-351 (1996): 
Id. 
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Plessy Court 
also rejected Plcssy's claim by first reasoning that, though the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to enforce the "absolute equality of the two 
races before the law," the equality mandated was only "political equality" 
and did not extend to "social equality." To illustrate the difference, the 
Court cited prior precedent holding that a state could not prohibit people 
of the "colored race" from sitting on a jury because such a prohib ition 
"implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of 
the right of the colored race, and was a step toward reducing them to a 
condition of servility." The Court rejected this implication with regard to 
the use of railroad cars by passengers, however, on the basis that the 
exercise of the police power to provide separate but equal railroad cars 
was reasonable in that it promoted the public good and was not intended 
for the oppression of a particular class. To buttress its "reasonable" 
argument, the Court noted that even the Congress of the United States 
required separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia. 
The Court further reasoned that the state of Louisiana, through 
the enforced separation of the two races, was not stamping the colored 
race with a "badge of inferiority," but instead, if members of the colored 
race felt such a stamp, it was they themselves as opposed to the state of 
Louisiana that was imposing the stamp. The Court flatly rejected the 
argument that "equal [social] rights cannot be secured to the negro except 
by an enforced commingling of the two races." Plessy came to stand for 
the proposition that a state could segregate school children according to 
race as long as the facilities in question being provided by the state were 
provided to both races equally. 
34 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. ("[T]he enforced separation of the races, as applied to the 
internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored 
man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal 
protection of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. . . "). 
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equal ' doctrine was the requirement that in order to  be a valid exercise o� police 
power, it "must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted m g�od 
faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppress10n 
of a particular class."35 This decision and the resulting ' separate but equal ' doctrine 
. I 3 6 d s e t  t h e  c o u n t r y  u p o n  a s o c 1 a  a n  
35 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 550. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist 
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses 
to put that construction on it. 
Id. at 55 1 .  But see Justice Harlan' s  dissenting opinion in which he argued that "[t]he 
arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, i s  
a badge o f  servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the 
law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds." Id. at 
562. 
36 See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF }UST/CE 
THURGOOD MARHSALL 7, n. 7 ( 1 993)('"Jim Crow' describes a practice or policy o f  
segregation or discrimination against Negroes in public places, public vehicles, employment, 
schools ,  etc. The term derives from a song sung by Thomas Rice in a mid- 1 800s Negro 
minstrel show."); RALPH E. LUKER , HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 1 33-34 ( 1 997) 
Jim Crow. A term which refers to a wide variety of legal and extralegal 
practices of racial discrimination in the United States in  the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth centuries. The term had its origin in a white 
minstrel show popular across the North in the 1 830s . In it, Thomas 
Dartmouth "Daddy" Rice, appearing in blackf ace, danced and sang a 
number called "Jump Jim Crow." Later, the white South reacted to 
emancipation and the end of  Reconstruction by enactin g  laws separating 
the races, restricting the franchise of African Americans and confirming 
social mores that discriminated against them. These laws and mores were 
called "Jim Crow." In law, they banned intermarriage, disfranchised 
A frican Americans by a variety of provisions and mandated separate 
housing, public accommodations, schools, and transportation. 
Id. See a/so, HENRY J. ABRAHAM & B A RBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 332-33 (7lh ed. 1 998) 
The Court' s position, as noted earlier . . .  , was that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not place under federal protection "the entire domain of 
civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the states," and that the 
protection offered by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was 
against state action only, not against private action. And in 1 896 the 
Court upheld the convenient discriminatory concept of "separate but 
equal'· in the case of Plessy \'. Ferguson. To all intents and purposes the 
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jurisprudential course that was prophetical ly described by Justice Harlan as 
"pernicious. "37 
Justice Harlan attacked the majority decision in Plessy on several fronts.38 
black was at the mercy of the states-there was no Warren Court to redress 
grievances.  Indeed, until World War II the federal government assumed 
at most a highly limited role in the protection of civil rights on the state 
level. 
Before 1 9 1 0  almost 90 percent of America' s blacks Ii ved in the 
South and the Border . . . .  the core of racial discrimination was naturally 
found there, on both the public and the pri vate level. Thus public 
authorities at the state and local level s, usually under the guise of the 
Court-upheld separate but equal concept, enacted measures (sometimes 
taking the form of a constitutional provision) permitting or even requiring 
segregation of buses, streetcars, taxicabs, railroads. waiting rooms, 
comfort stations, drinking fountains, state and local schools, state colleges 
and universities, hospitals, jails, cemeteries, sport facilities, beaches, bath 
houses, swimming pools, parks, golf courses, courthouse cafeterias, 
libraries, dwellings, theaters, hotels, restaurants, and other similar 
facilities-be these public, quasi-public, or private in nature; and interracial 
marriages were widely proscribed. Private individuals and groups, on 
their own initiative, and not infrequently encouraged by state authorities, 
acted to deny blacks, and often other non-Caucasians as well, access to 
social clubs, fraternities and sororities, private schools, colleges, 
universities, churches, cemeteries, funeral parlors, hospitals, hotels, 
dwellings, restaurants, movies, bowling alleys, swimming pools, bath 
houses . . . .  There was nothing particularly secretive about either public 
or private discrimination; it was simply an accepted way of life-accepted 
by many blacks as well as by almost all whites . 
Id. at 333. 
3 7  Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 5 59. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the 
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1 5 1 ,  1 55 ( 1 996) ("Harlan's opinion also reflected a 
deserved confidence in the power of his analysis; even in 1 896, even writing alone, he 
correctly predicted that j udicial fiat could not forever impose a policy that was 
fundamentally wrong." citing Harlan, Plessy Dissent p.  559 ("[T]he judgment this day 
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
in the Dred Scott case."). 
38 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 559 ( Harlan, J.) (" [tlhe law regards man as man, and takes no 
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the 
supreme law of the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, 
the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is 
competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon 
the basis of race." ) .  
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In addition to predicting continued racial strife,39 he focused on the interplay 
between the use of invidious racial classifications and the language of the then 
recently ratified constitutional amendments. I_-Ie argued that the 
}
'hirteent� ,40 
Fourteenth,41 and Fifteenth42 Amendments were mtended to remove the race lme 
from our governmental systems."43 Citing the Court' s previous conclusion that race 
39 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public 
highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than 
those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enj oyment 
of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast o f  the freedom enj oyed by 
our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that 
boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude 
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens,-our equals 
before the law. 
Id. at 562. 
40 U . S .  CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 .  "Neither slavery nor i nvoluntary servitude, except as a 
punis hment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within · 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 
41 U . S .  CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Id. 
All persons born or n aturalized in the United S tates, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of Jaw; nor deny to any person within i ts j urisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
42 U.S . CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any S tate on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude").  
4 3  Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 555. See ANDREW KULL, THE COL.DR-BLIND CONSTITUTION ( 1 992). 
[S ]talc legislation "conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose 
of humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race" must be 
"hostile to both the spirit and leller of the Constitution of the United 
States." This is a better explanation of the illegality of racial segregation 
than has yet appeared in any opinion for a majority of the Supreme Court. 
It is not, of course, an argument for a color-blind Constitution. Racially 
discriminatory legislation may be neither conceived in hostility to, nor 
enacted for the purpose of humiliating, citizens o f  the United States of a 
particular race. Alternatively, Jim Crow laws might be rejected on the 
ground that they impose an unreasonable classification, without implying 
any broader rule of antidiscrimination. Harlan consciously went further: 
he dcvcloocd an argument for a color-blind Constitution because he was 
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could not be used to disqualify potential jurors, Justice Harlan articulated a more 
expansive reading of these constitutional provisions. In assessing the rights and 
immunities afforded to African Americans,  h e  concluded that "the constitution of 
the United States, in its present form, forbids,  so far as civil and political rights are 
concerned, discrimination by the general g o vernment or the states against any 
citizen because of his race. All citizens are equal before the law."44 
Justice Harlan' s  color-blind interpretation of the constitution is facially 
supportive of the struggle of African Americans. However, the concept of the 
'color-blind' constitution has shortcomings that modern jurists and constitutional 
s c h o l a r s h a v e  s e i z e d  u p o n . 4 5 
unwilling to rely on judges to distinguish a good racial classification from 
a bad one. 
Id. at 121 . EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 2 1 2  (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1 970). 
The work of reconstructing the divided and battlescarred nation after the 
Civil War took many fonns. Most relevant for our purposes were the 
basis for the nation's commitment to the concept of equality. Within five 
years after the guns of the Civil War had been silenced, Congress had 
proposed and the country had ratified three amendments which purported 
to give the newly freed slaves civil and political equality with all other 
Americans. The Thirteenth Amendment told the Negro that slavery could 
have no place in this nation and that he could no longer be treated as 
chattel, to be bought and sold at the caprice of his white master. The 
Fourteenth Amendment conferred national citizenship on the Negro and 
told him that he could expect due process and equal protection before the 
law. The Fifteenth Amendment gave the Negro the most potent weapon 
in the democratic arsenal - the vote - and promised him the he could 
participate fully in the American political process. The three amendments 
had a common feature - they designated the Congress as the governmental 
body that would take action to ensure that the new commitment to equality 
would be fulfilled. 
Id. at 215. 
44 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 5 5 6 .  
45 See BRYAN K .  FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY (1997). 
What did Harlan mean by his dissent in Plessy? What was the context for 
his insistence that the American Cons ti tu ti on is color blind? Harlan' s 
primary concern in Plessy was undoing black caste. He understood the 
implicit message behind segregation statutes: that blacks arc inferior, unfit 
to associate with whites. Harlan did not pronounce his color blindness 
principle in an equal society but, rather, in one in which race was a 
benchmark for status. He considered the Louisiana law unconstitutional 
because it implied the inferiority of blacks and the superiority of whites. 
226 A KRON LAW REVIEW 
[ Vol .  33:2 
However, some commentators have made clahorate arg uments that Harlan 
intended that the government never he ahlc to u se race as a criterion in its 
decision making, including when the government sought Lo remedy past 
discrimination or eliminate current caste.  B u t  these arguments t ake 
Harlan's  statements out of context and Lum his color hl indncss pri nciple 
on its head. Justice William Brennan ohscrved how Justice Brown ' s  
opinion i n  Plessy turned the equal protection c l ause agai nst those whom 
it was intended to set free, condemning them to a " separate hut eq ual" 
status before the law, a status al ways separate hut seldom equal.  /\nd now 
some people want to recast Harlan's dissent axa i11st blacks. condemning 
them to racial caste. 
Id. at 102; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and thl' Future of tlze Di1·enity 
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. I ,  7 ( 1 998) . 
The ongoing debate regarding the constitutionality of racial preferences 
for purposes of affirmative action often focuses on whether the reasons 
for being especially suspicious of invidious racial discri mination arc 
equally applicable to "benign " preferences . To a large extent, 
contemporary di sputes over racial preferences tend Lo pi t two di fferent 
conceptions of equal protection in the context of race agai nst each other. 
The Hopwood majority, as well as Justice Scalia, essential ly rely on the 
"colorblind principle, " which holds that any consideration of race in 
governmental decision making, other than for strictly remedial purposes, 
is presumptively unconstitutional . This conclusion may arise for some or 
all of the following reasons: such consideration of race is inconsistent 
with the original understanding of equal protection, is premised on 
assumptions of racial inferiority, denigrates the individual through the use 
of irrelevant and racially based stereotypes, is immoral, is stigmatizing, or 
leads to enduring racialism. Arguably, Justice Powell applied a softer 
version of the colorblind principle in Bakke, concluding that all racial 
classifications must be strictly scrutinized, but that the non-remedial 
interest of diversity in education could justify a limited use of racial 
preferences. A competing approach favored by many academics, and 
partially reflected in the opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke, is known 
as the "anti-subordination principle," which holds that the use of race by 
the government is wrong only when it subordinates any racial group. The 
colorblind principle exalts the rights of the individual, while the 
anti-subordination principle emphasizes the rights of racial groups. Both 
of these principles usually lead to similar results in cases of classic 
invidious discrimination; however, they tend to produce diametrically 
opposite conclusions in  the context of affirmative action. The 
anti-subordination approach has been definitively rejected by the courts. 
Thus, the j udicial debate, as reflected by Hopwood, has focused o n  
whether the pure colorblind approach of Justice Scalia or the more 
moderate colorblind approach of Justice Powell in Bakke should prevail. 
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Justice Harlan's oft-q uoted language is a very po werful entreaty for the Court to 
recognize the equal constitutional rights of all people on a race neut ral basis. He 
writes that: 
[T]here is n o  caste he re. Our cons ti tution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor  tolerates classes among citizens . In respect of 
civil-rights, all citi zens are equal before the law. The humblest is 
the peer of the most powerful . The l a w  regards man as man, and 
takes no acco unt of his surroundings o r  of his color when hi s civil 
rights as guarantied by the supreme l a w  of the land are involved.46 
Notwithstanding this entreaty, J us tice Harlan did not abandon notions of 
racial superiority with respect to societal interaction between the races. With the 
simultaneous granting of equal constitutional rights, Justice Harlan did not fail to 
pay homage to the continued dominance of the white race .47 He reass ures both 
Id. at 5-7; Chris K. Iijima, Swimming From the Island of the Colorblind: Deserting an ill­
conceived Constitutional Metaphor, in Symposium Using law and Identity to Script 
Cultural Production, 1 7  LoY . L.A . ENT. L. J.  583  ( 1 997):  
Unfortunately, the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the 
ideological end to racial hierarchy with what already exists. That is, the 
prescriptive ideal of a "colorblind" society, in which racism and White 
supremacy are eradicated, has been transformed by judicial fiat into "a 
condition of societal denial," creating the illusion that racial hierarchy has 
been eliminated. Indeed, "denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary 
American racism." And, of course, the denial of reality merely 
perpetuates the condition of racial subordin ation. 
Id. at 591 . See also other discussions of constitutional color-blindness, REv A B .  SIEGEL, The 
Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE 
AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin, eds., 
1998); CHARLES R.  LA WREN CE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE 
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67-87 (1997); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The 
New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 5 1  U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 191 (1997); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA ( 1 99 6); ANDREW KULL, THE COWR-BLIND 
CONSTITUTION ( 1 992). 
46 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.  
47 Gabriel J .  Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 5 1 ,  157 ( 1996). 
Harlan's comments about the Chinese in the Plessy dissent strike the 
modern ear as racist. Harlan, of course, was well aware of the 
discrimination imposed upon Chinese by the national government; they 
could neither immigrate nor become citizens, disadvantages imposed on 
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h imself and his constituency that 
[t]he white race deems itself to be the domina� t race i
_
n th
_
i s  
country. And so  it  i s ,  in prestige, in  achie vements. m education, m 
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, i t  w i l l  continue to be for al l  
time, if  it remains true to  its great heri tage, and holds fast to the 
principles of consti tutional l iberty .48 
After 58 years the Court abandoned Plessy 's ' separate but eq ual ' doctrine 
wi th its landmark desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education .-19 Brown 
represented a clear departure from the Court ' s  prior interpretation of the 
constitutional validity o f  state-sponsored segregation .50 The Court decisively 
no other race at that time. Harlan must also have known that thi s  federal 
discrimination perpetuated a system of disadvantage imposed hy the 
states. Aliens "ineligible to citizenship," a category that was essenti ally 
limited to Asians, were subject to various legal disabilities, such as 
prohibitions on entering licensed professions and owning real property. 
However, Harlan's reaction to disadvantages imposed on Chinese by law 
was not that they should be invalidated according to his color-blindness 
principle. In this respect, Harlan's response not only failed to comport 
with modern arguments about the anti -subordination purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it did not even satisfy the notion of simple formal 
equality. Instead, Harlan made what seems to have been an early 
"underinclusiveness" argument similar to that found in modern equal 
protection analysis: the law was irrational because it burdened one 
despised minority but not another, and the one that was not burdened was 
even more worthy of segregation from Caucasians. 
Id. at 1 57-15 8.  
48 Plessy, 1 63 U.S.  at 559. 
49 Brown v.  Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 954). 
50 This departure was not totally unexpected. During the 1 8  years preceding the Brown 
decision, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund systematically litigated graduate school 
desegregation cases. See State of Missouri v. Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 ( 1 938)(Furthering of 
the 'separate but equal' doctrine, the Court ordered the State of Missouri to either admit 
Lloyd Gaines to its School of Law or provide an equivalent facility within the State. 
Unfortunately, Gaines' mysterious disappearance mooted any further action in this case); 
Pearson v. Murray, 1 8 2 Atl. Rpt. 590 (1 936)(orderin g  the admission of Donald Murray to 
the University of Maryland Law School because there were no other equal educational 
opportunities for Murray within the State); Sipuel v. B d. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 
U.S.  63 1 (1 948)(ordering the admission of Ada Lois S ipuel to the University of Oklahoma 
School of Law); McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S.  637 
( 1 950)(prohibiting the University of Oklahoma from imposing segregatist conditions on 
McLaurin's admission, such as requiring him to " sit  apart at a designated desk in an 
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rejected 'separate but equal ' doctrine of Plessy. Chief Justice Warren' s  
renunciation of Plessy i n  this context was clear. He wrote that " i n  the field of 
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal ' has no place.  Separate 
educational facilities  are inherently unequal."5 1 But, the Brown court only 
discussed the psycholo gical harm that African Americans suffered as a result of 
segregation .52 The Brown court failed to expressly repudiate the discussion in 
Plessy regarding the constitutional rights and privileges afforded to African 
Americans in the p o s t-war amendments.53 Nor did the Brown court entertain Justice 
anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the 
library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table 
and to eat at a different time from other students in the school cafeteria); S weatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S.  629( 1 950)(holding that the new law school the State of Texas establi shed for 
blacks was unequal to the legal educational facilities and opportunities available to white 
students, and as a result compelled Sweatt's admission to the University o f  Texas Law 
School). See also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT 62-79, 85-9 1 ( 1 994): 
But while Sweatt had appeared to offer a way of winning without ruling 
on the constitutionality of segregation, Mcwurin had seemed to present 
the issue of s egregation and nothing else. Nevertheless, saying that 
McLaurin was being treated unequall y  was not the same as deciding the 
issue of segregation. Of course, that might mean that all segregation 
amounted to inequality, which the Court c arefully avoided saying. 
Id. at 77-78; CARL T. Row AN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE w ORLD OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL ( 1 993):  
There was Marshall the sagacious strategist. Few of his cases tell more 
about the skills, the personal dedication, the wit and sarcasm of Marshall 
than this broadside attack on Jim Crow in higher education in Oklahoma 
. . . .  On January 1 4, 1 946, Ada Sipuel applied for admission [to the 
University of Oklahoma] . Marshall knew that an awful lot was at stake. 
He still fumed over winning a trailblazing case, the Gaines lawsuit in 
Missouri, only  to have Gaines vanish. In the case of Sipuel, Marshall, 
Hall, and the other NAACP lawyers intended to go far beyond Gaines and 
try to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for wiping out not only 
"We'll give you tuition to go to school in a northern state," or "We' l l  set 
up a separate law school for you," but all forms of racial discrimination 
in graduate and professional education. 
Id. at 1 45- 146. 
5 1 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
52 Id. at 494 ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.") 
53 DONALDG. NIEMAN, PROMISESTO .KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANSANDTHE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT ( 1 99 1 ) : 
While Warren had no doubt about the proper outcome, he was determined 
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Harlan' s  concept of the color-blind constitution, althoug� variou� mani f�stations 
of this concept were being incorporated into the Amencan social fabnc at the 
time.54 
to avoid "precipitous action that would inflame [ the white South ] more 
than necessary." This concern rather than abstract legal principles shaped 
his opinion in the Brown case, which was announced on May 17 ,  1954. 
To avoid antagonizing whites, Warren refrained from attacking 
segregation as part of a caste system that was designed to preserve white 
supremacy and that w as on its face a denial of equal protection. Rather 
than suggesting that Plessy had been wrongly decided and that 
southerners had supported a blatantly unconstitutional institution for more 
than a half century, he contended that recent developments had made 
segregation incompatible with the guarantees o f  equal protection. In 
recent years public education had become far more important than it had 
been when the Fourteenth Amendment had been adopted or when Plessy 
had been decided. In fact, it now was "a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his 
environment." Citing recent social science research, Warren argued that 
segregation denied black children the full benefit of education and thus 
put them at a considerable disadvantage. 
Id. at 749. 
54 See RICHARD KLUGER, discusses the relevance of the Brown decision in SIMPLE JUSTICE 
7 49 ( 1976 )("Did not mean he would be invited to lunch at the Rotary the followin g  week. 
It meant something more basic and important. It meant that black rights had suddenly been 
redefined; black bodies had s uddenly been reborn under a new law. Blacks' value as human 
beings had changed overnight by the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke, 
the Justices had severed the remaining cords of de facto slavery. The Negro could n o  longer 
be fastened with the status of official pariah. He was both thrilled that the signal for the 
demise of his caste status had come from on high and angry that it had taken so long and first 
exacted so steep a price in s uffering"). See also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE 
COURTS 1 16 ( 1994): 
Nominally, the Court' s only legal directive in Brown was that states might 
no longer segregate the races in schools. B ut in fact the decision 
destroyed the edifice of legitimacy upon which Plessy had placed 
segregation, laid the foundation for the civil rights movement, and 
revolutionized the notions of what courts, lawyers, and the law might do 
to expand racial justice. And much more, including sening in motion 
consequences for o ther minorities and disadvantaged groups besides 
blacks, as well as suggesting how the law might be used to advance and 
secure human rights in other countries. 
Id. at 1 16. 
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Although dormant for 58 years, the theory of the color-bl ind constitution 
re-emerged in American jurisprudence and sensibilities after the Brown decision.55 
The Supreme Court had not ignored Justice Harlan ' s  theory of constitutional color­
blindness. In fact, Civil Rights activists and members of the NAACP' s Legal 
Defense and Education Fund embraced the c oncept as an effective method of 
eliminating invidious racial discrimination from society, but did not fully address 
its long term consequences .56 In the years following Brown, the Justices grappled 
with the constituti onal dilemma underlying the implementation of race-based 
remedial measures, while simultaneously fostering race neutrality in the Court's 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.  J ustice Powell and Justice O' Connor 
were at the forefront of this judicial struggle,  and both adopted the concept of the 
color-blind constitution in various contexts. 57 J ustice Powell ' s  consistent support 
55 See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: 
ONE NATION lNDIVISIBLE l 01 ( 1 997). 
Id. 
Brown remains the most important S upreme Court decision in this 
century. It marked the beginning of the end of the Jim Crow South. But 
it was not the end of all laws separating the races, and indeed the Court 
was clearly aware o f  the limits of its power. To have barred racial 
classifications as a hasis for governmental action - as the NAACP had 
urged - would have meant, for instance, that state laws forbidding 
interracial marriages were also unconstitutional. Neither in 1 954, nor for 
thirteen years thereafter, was that an issue the Court was willing to take 
on. Brown was ahead of the public opinion curve, but not way ahead . .  
. . Declaring the Constitution "color-blind" would likely have had another 
long-term effect: later race-conscious policies would have run into 
constitutional trouble. No court could have approved race-based hiring 
at the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation; in Boston, Judge 
Arthur Garrity could not have ordered busing to achieve racial balance in 
public schools. Both involved racial classifications, of which Justice 
Harlan (it seems safe to say) would not have approved. 
56 See generally, DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1 776 TO THE PRESENT ( 1 99 1 ); HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA 
A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
384-389 (7Lh ed. l 998)(discussing non-violent methods used by civil right advocates by 
eradicate insidious forms of racial discrimination); HOWELL RAINES, MY SouLis RESTED: 
MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED ( 1 977)(discussing a collection of 
interviews with people who experienced various facets of the Civil Rights Movement, 
including politicians, grass roots civil rights workers, educators, lawyers and policemen); 
MICHAEL L. LEVINE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1 6 1 9  TO THE PRESENT 
166-208 (1996). 
57 Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional 
Colorblind Principle, 39 How.L.J. 367, 376 ( 1 995). 
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for this principle can be seen in his plurality opinion in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke,58 and his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick.59 
The concept of constitutional color-bli ndness was resurrected in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence by Justice Powell in his opinion in Bakke.60 In Bakke, the 
University of California, when faced with a challenge to its race-based medical 
school admissions program, argued that the strict scrutiny analysis was i napplicable 
because claims of "discrimination against members of the white 'maj ority ' cannot 
be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as ' benign. ' "6 1 Justice Powell rejected 
Id. 
Presumably, Justices Powell and O' Connor' s attraction to a colorblind 
Constitution is grounded in the idea that it implies both legal and value 
neutrality, and creates a symbolic appearance of inescapable logic. In a 
vacuum, a colorblind Constitution is precisely what many would want in 
any governing document, particularly with respect to the Equal Protection 
Clause. Yet, the Court' s sudden rush to a colorblind principle, after over 
two hundred years of ignoring such an egalitarian ideal, misses the mark. 
The resolution of legal issues involving race cannot be confined to the 
realm of ideas. 
58 Regents of the Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978).  
5 9  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.  448 ( 1 980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
5 1 5  U.S. 200, 235 ( 1 995)("0f course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held 
federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer 
controlling"). 
60 See JOHN c. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 
469 ( 1 994). 
Id. 
On the one hand, Powell concluded, it was simply "too late in the day" to 
forbid all racial preferences. Outlawing affirmative action would be a 
"disaster for the country." Even if he were driven into an intellectual 
corner, Powell would find a way to allow some affirmative action, under 
some circumstances, at least for the time being. On the other hand, said 
Powell, it would be equally disastrous to give carte blanche for racial 
preferences. Public institutions would be vulnerable to the demands of 
special interests. Benefits would be carved up among competing 
minorities in an ugly game of racial politics. Powell wanted to allow 
some affirmative action, but also to constrain it, to keep it in check so that 
race-consciousness would not become the norm. He wanted to preserve 
for the future the ideal of a color-blind society. 
61 Bakke, 43 8 U.S.  at 294. See also Justice Powell' s p lurality opinion in Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U.S.  267 (1 986) ("The C ourt has recognized that the level of 
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a 
group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.") 
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this argument. In order to j ustify the u s e  of a race-based classification, Justice 
Powell concluded that the strict scrutiny test demands a "j udicial determination that 
the burden he is asked to bear on that basis i s  precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest."62 In addition to recognizing the administrative 
difficulty inherent i n  " v arying the level of j udicial review accordi ng to a perceived 
' preferred' status of a particular racial or ethnic minority ,"63 he noted that 
identification of members of "majority and 'minority' necessari I y reflect temporary 
arrangements and political judgments ."64 H e  concluded that the guarantees of the 
Equal Protection Clause are avail able to "every person regardless of his 
background. "65 
There are two themes in Justice Powell ' s  plurality opinion that serve as the 
underlying basis for his  decision to apply the strict scrutiny anal ysis to evaluate the 
constitutionality of race-based clas sifications.  He initially recognized the 
individualized nature of the rights guaranteed b y  the Equal Protection Clause.66 The 
62 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 ("We have held that in 'order to justify the use of a suspect 
classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally 
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary . _ . to the 
accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."). 
63 Id. at 295. 
64 Id. at 295. 
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory 
considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that 
judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic 
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces . Disparate 
constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to 
exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them. 
[citation omitted] Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based 
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for 
consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, 
a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. 
Id. at 298-99. 
65 Id. at 299. 
66 But see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S.  200, 239 ( 1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
In my view, government can never have a "compelling interest" in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction. [citation omitted] Individuals 
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made 
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a 
creditor or a debtor race. That concept i s  alien to the Constitution' s  focus 
upon the individual, . . .  and its rejection of dispositions based on race, . 
. . or based on blood, . . . .  To pursue the concept of racial entitlement -
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embodiment of Justice Powell ' s  neutral interpretation of the post-war constitutional 
amendments was forcefully articulated in Bakke: 
If it is the indi vidual who is entitled to judicial protection against 
classifications based upon his racial o r  ethnic background because such 
distinctions i mpinge upon personal rights,  rather than the indivi dual only 
because of h i s  membership in a particular group, then constitutional 
standards may be applied consistently .  Political judgments regarding the 
necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the 
constitutional balance, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U . S .  2 1 4  ( 1944), 
but the standard of j ustification will remain constant.67 
Consi stent with the S upreme Court ' s post-Brown interpretation, Justice Powell 
arg u e d  that the rights afforded by the Equal Protection Clause are "guaranteed to 
the individual. The rights established are personal rights."68 To preserve their 
meaning, each individual, regardless of race or ethnicity, must have an equal 
opportunity to assert these rights and privi leges .  69 This theme is consi stent in post-
even for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race 
slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are 
just one race here. It is American. 
Id. at 239. 
67 Bakke, 438 U.S.  at 299. 
68 Id. See also Missouri v .  Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 1 20-2 1  ( 1 995) (Thomas, J.,  concurring). 
Id. 
Indeed, Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or 
social-science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental, 
truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the 
basis of race . . . .  As the Court's unanimous opinion indicated: " [l]n the 
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." (citation omitted) 
At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the 
principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals,  and not 
as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this reason that 
we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which 
(aside from two decisions rendered in the midst of wartime, [Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S . 8 1 ( 1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 2 1 4( 1 944)] has proven automatically fatal. 
69 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another 
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal"). 
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Brown decisions.70 
Similar themes are al so apparent from J ustice Powell ' s  concurring opinion 
in Fullilove. In Fullilove, J ustice Powell applied the strict scrutiny test to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a minority set-aside program. Pursuant to an amendment to 
the Public Works Employment Act of 1 977, the statute required that "at least 1 O per 
centum of the amo unt of each grant shall be expended for min ority business 
enterprises."71 The Plaintiffs, who were h eating and cooling c onstruction 
contractors, filed an Equal Protection action chall enging the facial validity of the 
minority set-aside provi sion .72 The majority upheld the facial validity of the statute 
by applying a hybrid equal protection analysis which was influenced b y  the Court's 
deference to Congressional decision-making authority.73 The Court described its 
analytical reasoning as a two-step process which focused on 
whether the obj ectives of this legislation are within the power of 
Congress.  If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited u se 
of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, i s  a 
70 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U . S .  547, 602 ( 1 990) (O'Connor, J. ,  with C.J. 
Rehnquist, Justice S calia and Justice Kennedy, disscnting)("At the heart of the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government 
must treat citizens 'as in di vi duals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or 
national class"'). 
7 1 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U . S .  448, 454 ( 1 980). 
72 Id. at 455. 
73 The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 ( 1 990), used a similar 
analysis when evaluating the constitutionality of a FCC program that used racial preferences 
in the assignment of broadcast licenses. Justice Brennan ' s  opinion set forth an intermediate 
scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality of this race-based preference with added 
deference afforded to the validity of the legislation because of its Congressional origin. In 
Metro Broadcasting the Court concluded that: 
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress - even i f  those 
measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate 
victims of .past governmental or societal discrimination - are 
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important 
governmental obj ectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 
Id. at 548. The Supreme Court in Adarand overturned both of these decisions to the extent 
that they were based on the application of an erroneous constitutional standard. In Adarand, 
the Court held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . In other 
words, such classifications are constitutional only is they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests." Ada rand, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, 227 ( 1 995). 
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constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional 
objectives and does not violate the equal protection component o f  
the Due Process Clause o f  the Fifth Amendment. 74 
Consistent with his opinion in Bakke, in Fullilove Justice Powell reiterated 
his commitment to a racially neutral interpretation of the con stitu tion . 75 He stressed 
that "[r]acial classifications must be assessed u n der the most stringent level of 
review because immutable c haracteristics, which bear no relation to i ndi vi dual merit 
or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental deci sion. "76 In this regard, the 
presumption of constitutional invalidity inherent in the use of rac ial cl assifications 
was rebutted by the j ustification of "eradicating the continu i ng e ffects of past 
discrimination identified by Congress ."77 Notwithstanding his firm belief in the 
racial neutrality of the Constitution, Justice Powell also acknowledged the necessity 
for recognition of "narrowly defined circumstances"78 to defeat the argument that 
the strict scrutiny tes t  i s  "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."79 
The second theme apparent from Justice Powell 's  plurality opinion in 
Bakke is found in his  interpretation of the plain meaning of the l anguage of the 
Equal Protection Clause.8° First, he noted that the meaning of '"equal protection of 
74 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473. The Supreme Court has stated that "[ t]his Court' s approach 
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as Lo equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wicsenfcld, 420 U.S. 
636, 638, n.2 (1975). See also Fullilove, 448 U . S .  448, 496 (Powell, J .  concurring) ("The 
Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, demand that any governmental distinction among groups must be 
justifiable.") 
75 Note that the Adarand decision overruled Fullilove ("Of course, it follows that to the 
extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous 
standard, it is no longer controlling") Adarand, 5 1 5  U . S .  at 235. 
76 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496. 
77 Id. at 496. Although Justice Powell noted that "this Court has never approved race­
conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional 
or statutory violations," unquestionably Congress "has the authority to identi fy unlawful 
discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradicate 
their continuing effects." Id. at 497, 502. 
78 Id. at 496, n. I .  
79 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507. 
80 See also Hirabayashi v. U.S.,  320 U.S. 8 1 ,  1 00 ( 1 943)("Distinctions between citizens 
�ol�ly ?ecause of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
mst1t�t10n� are f?un?e� upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative class1ficat1on. or d1scmnmation based on race alone has o ften been held to be a denial of equal protection."). 
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the law, ' is susceptible of varying interpretation s .  "81 Citing Justice Holmes, Powell 
argues for the use o f  ' p arol evidence' such as "circumstances and the time"82 to 
assist in his interpretation of this phrase.83 However, defined b y  words such as 
"fair, just"84 or "equal i n  status, achievement, o r  a particular quality ,"85 the tenn 
equal does not have the interpretative elasticity to incorporate group c haracteristics 
into its parameters. 86 The i mplication is that the equal protection afforded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment i s  neutral and "framed i n  universal terms, without reference 
to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude."87 
81 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U . S .  265, 284 ( 1978). 
82 Id. at 284. 
83 When interpreting the definition of the word ' discrimination' as used in §60 1  of Title VI, 
Justice Powell cited Justice Holmes' proposition that " [a] word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it i s  used." Id. at 284. 
84 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 766 ( 1986). 
8 5  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 767 ( 1 986) . B ut see the tenn 'equality' as interpreted by Aldous Huxley 
(1 894- 1963), who wrote that "[t)hat all men are equal is a proposition to which, at ordinary 
times, no sane human being has ever given his assent." The Idea of Equality, PROPER 
STUDIES (1927), reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 1 09 n. 10  
(ed. Tony Augarde 1 99 1 ) . 
86 See Statement by State Representative W.P. Jencks from Clarion and Jefferson Counties 
to the Pennsylvania Legislature on January 23, 1 876 urging ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
By the first section i t  is intended to destroy every distinction founded 
upon a difference in the caste, nationality, race or color or persons who 
have been or may be born in and subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, which had found its way into the laws of the Federal or State 
Governments which regulate the civil relations or rights of the people. No 
law shall be made or executed which does not secure equal civil rights to 
all. In all matters of civil legislation and administration there shall be 
perfect legal equality in the advantages and securities guaranteed by each 
State to every one here declared a citizen, without distinction of race or 
color, every one being equally entitled to demand from the States and 
State authorities full security in the enjoyment of such advantages and 
securities . . . .  the first section declares the civil rights of the black to be 
equal to those of the white . . . .  
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 1 9  ( 1 98 1 ) . 
87 Bakke, 438 U.S . at 293 .  See Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8 1 ,  100 
( 1 943)("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. 
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The origin of Justice Powell ' s  defi n ition of equality can be traced to the 
natural rights phil o sophy espoused by the framers of America' s most che�ished 
documents. The natural rights theorists look to the l anguage of the Dec l aration of 
Independence as one of the first articulations o f  th i s  principle. 
On July 4, 1 776, the Congre s s  u n an imously adopted the 
Declaration of Independence drafted by Tho mas J cff crson, with a 
newly recognized principle that was to re vol utionize the United 
States in the years 1 865-68, that ' a l l  men arc created equa l , '  and 
with a solemn recognition of the natura l  rights basis o f  our 
fundamental rights. 'All men, '  wrote J e fferson. 'arc endowed by 
their Creator with certain unal ienable R i ghts,  that among them are 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happi n e s s .  ' 88 
Professor Chester J .  Antieau argue s  that "the emphasis upon equal ity of 
right provided the basis in 1 866-68 for the Eq ual Protection C l au se of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."89 For example, Profe s s or Anticau cites co mmentary from 
the debates held on this matter during the Thirty-Ninth Congress to substantiate this 
position. "On January 1 0, 1 866, Representati ve John F. Farnsworth, a Republican 
from Illinois, told the House: 'When our Fathers, when they framed the Dec laration 
of Independence, dec l ared that all men inherited the same rights' it meant that ' so 
far a s  these natural rights were concerned, that one man was equal  to any other 
For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often 
been held to be a denial of.equal protection.").  
88 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 70-7 1  (1 997) 
The natural, fundamental rights belonging to citizens by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were implicitly to be 
equally shared and enjoyed. Since at least Cicero, it has been understood 
that equality of natural rights is of the essence of a shared humanity. This 
was well understood by America' s Founding Fathers. James Wil s on . . .  
wrote: "The natural rights of man belong equally to all." It is clear that 
the Re��blican leaders in �� Thirty-Ninth Congress were committed, by 
the Pnvileges
_ 
and Immunities Clause, not  only to protecting natural, fundamental nghts, but also to ensure thereby the traditional equality of suc
_
h rights. The First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment was almost e�trrely (except �or the first sentence) the product of Representati ve J ohn �mgham o� Oh10. I� 1 857 Bingham had assured Congress that the natu�al 
_
or mherent :1ghts which belong to all men irrespective o f  all constitutional regulations, are by the Constitution g t d Id. at 243. uaran ee · 
89 Id. at 7 1 .  
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man."'90 During the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts articulated the n ormalizing component of the principle of 
equality. His definition of equality leaves no room for doubt regarding its scope: 
These are no vain words. Within the sphere of their influence no 
person can be created, no person c an be born, with civil or political 
privileges not equally enjoyed by all his fellow citizens; nor can 
any institution be established recognizing distinction of birth . Here 
is the great charter of every human bei n g  drawing vital breath upon 
this soil, whatever may be his condition and whoever may be his 
parents. He may be poor, weak, humble or black; he may be 
Caucasian, J e wish, Indian or Ethiopian race; he may be of French, 
German, Engl i s h, or Irish extracti on; but before the constitution all 
these distinctions disappear. He is not poor, weak, humble or 
Black; nor i s  he  Caucasian, Indian or Ethiopian; nor is he French, 
German, Engl i s h  or Irish. He is Man, the equal of all his fel low 
men. He is one of the children of the State, which, l ike an 
impartial parent, regards all its offsprings with an equal care. To 
some it may j ustly allot higher duties according to higher 
capacities; but it welcomes all in its equal, hospitable board. The 
State, imitating the Divine justice,  i s  no respecter of persons.9 1  
The Supreme Court' s rejection of benign and invidious uses of racial 
classifications is consistent with this narrow definition of 'equality .' The Court has 
noted that constitutional equality mandates neutral application of the rights 
afforded thereunder. S uch decisions lead to arbitrary application of constitutional 
rights which is  contrary to the basic goal of encouraging certainty through a racially 
neutral interpretation of the constitution.92 Justice O' Connor noted that 
90 Id. 
[a]bsent searching j udicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are ' benign' or 'remedial ' and what classifications 
are in fact moti vated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or 
91 Id. at 239-40. 
92 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 5 1 5  U . S .  200, 227 ( 1995). ("These ideas have 
long been central to this Court' s understanding of equal protection, and holding 'benign' 
state and federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with them. ' [A] 
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,' ibid., should 
tolerate no retreat from the principle that government may treat people differently because 
of their race only for the most compelling reasons.") 
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simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose �f strict scruti�y is. 
to 
'smoke out' i llegitimate uses of race by assunng that the leg1slat1ve 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
highly suspect tool . The test also ensures that the 
.
mc�ns chosen 
'fit' this compell ing goal so closely that there 1s �1ttle _ �r no 
possibility that the motive for the c lassification was 1lleg1umate 
racial prej udice or stereotype.93 
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has been a consi ste n t  supporter of 
constitutional color-blindness. Her majority opinion in City of Richmond v. 
Croson,94 hermajority opinion inAdarand,95 and her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCc96reflect this philosophy. For example, Justice O'Connor echoes Justice 
Powell's  views on the individualized nature o f  the rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the majority opinion s he authored in Croson . Justice 
93 City of Richmond v. J .A. Croson Co., 488 U . S .  469, 493 ( 1 989).  
94 J.A Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469 ( 1989). 
95 Adarand, 515  U.S. at 227 
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all 
derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows from that 
principle that all governmental action based on race - a group 
classification long recognized as "in mos t  circumstances irrelevant and 
therefore prohibited," (citation omitted )  - s hould be subjected lo detailed 
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the 
laws has not been infringed. 
Id. See also Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a 
Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J .  367 ,  376 (Fall 1 995) :  
Id. 
Justice O' Connor' s attempt in Adarand to advance a colorblind 
notion of the Constitution betrays the Court' s impartiality. History is 
minimized. Slavery and segregation are disregarded. American legal 
history and precedent is dismissed. The tensions inherent in the political 
process, particularly in the context of race, are forgotten. By failing to 
consider these fundamental historical facts, a colorblind application of 
equal protection will not promote the venerable idea that all men be 
treated equ�lly before the law, but will p erpetuate the status quo. In other 
w?r�s, Justic�s P�well and O' Connor' s rush to a colorblind principle at 
th1� Juncture m 
.
�1story, accom?lishes the same objective that the "all 
dehberate speed concept was intended to accomplish in Brown 11 _ to 
kee� �e bu:de� of achieving racial harmony or equality on the victims 
(poht1cal nunonty) and not the perpetrators (political majority). 
96 Metro Broad., Inc . v. FCC, 497 U.S 547 ( 1 990) (O' Connor J d. · ) l d · b Ad d C 
· , ., issent1ng , overru e m part y aran onstructors v. Pena, 5 1 5  U . S .  200 ( 1 995). 
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O' Connor notes in Croson that "[t]o whatever racial group these citizens belong, 
their 'personal right s '  to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by 
a rigid rule erecting race as the sole c riterion in an aspect of public 
decisionmaking."97 S ubsequently, in her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, she rejects 
the use of group characteri stics to determine the applicability of consti tutional rights 
and privileges. She argues that in 
the Constitution' s guarantee of equal protection lies the s imple 
command that the Government must treat citizens ' as individuals, 
not 'as simp l y  components of a racial, religious, sexual or national 
class . . . .  Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and 
behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides 
that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among 
individual s based on the assumption that race or ethnicity 
determines h o w  they act or think.98 
Justice O' Connor' s color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause also reflects the second theme advanced by Justice Powell which focuses on 
the plain meaning of constitutional equality. 99 In Croson, she adopted Justice 
Powell's argument in Bakke that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection c annot mean 
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a 
person of another c olor."100 Justice O ' Connor reiterated her commitment to race­
neutral constitutional equality in the dissenting opinion she authored in Metro 
Broadcasting. Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice 
Kennedy, Justice O'Connor' s continued advocation of a color-blind interpretation 
of the constitution would not allow the Court to abandon strict scrutiny in favor of 
a lesser standard of review when evaluating race-based classifications implemented 
pursuant to Congressional mandate. She argued that 
Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior 
reflect their b ackground, but the Constitution provides that the 
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among 
individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity 
97 See l.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S.  at 493. 
98 Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U.S.  at 602. 
99 Justice O' Connor' s view of color-blindness extends beyond mere constitutional 
protections. In her dissenting opinion in Metro Broad. Inc. , she writes that "[a] s a Nation 
we aspire to create a society untouched by that history of [racial and ethnic] exclusion, and 
to ensure that equality defines all citizens' daily experience and opportunities as well as the 
protection afforded to them under law." Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U.S.  at 6 1 1 .  100 J.A. Croson Co. ,  488 U.S. at 494. 
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determines how they act or think. To uphold the challenged 
programs, the Court departs from these fundamental principles and 
from our traditional requirement that racial classifications are 
permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling interest. This departure marks a renewed toleration of 
racial classifications and a repudiation of our recent affirmation 
that the Constitution' s equal protection guarantees extend equally 
to all citizens. 10 1  
When evaluating the justifications for the use of any race-based 
classifications, regardless of whether such classificati ons disadvantage minority 
group members or members of dominant racial groups, Justice O' Connor argues 
that such inquiry must be governed by strict scrutiny . 1 02 By refusing to recognize 
a distinction between benign 103 and invidious forms of racial discrimination, 104 
101 Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U.S.  at 602 (O'Connor, J . ,  dissenting). 
rni In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued for a application of a "relaxed" standard of review 
of "race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals." J.A. Croson Co. ,  488 
U.S. at 535.  In response, Justice O' Connor noted that 
!elven were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal 
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability 
o f  di fferent groups to defend their interests in the representative process, 
heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of this 
case. One on the central arguments for applying a less exacting standard 
to 'benign' racial classifi cations is that such measures essentially involve 
a choice made by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves. If 
one aspect of the judiciary' s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to 
protect 'discrete and insular minorities' from maj oritarian prejudice or 
indifference, [citation omitted] . . .  some maintain that these concerns are 
not implicated when the 'white majority' places burdens upon itself. 
(citation omitted) The concern that the political majority will more easily 
act to the disadvantage o f  a minority based on unwarranted assumptions 
or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application 
of heightened judicial s crutiny in this case. 
Id. at 495-96. 
llJJ In her dissent in Metro Broad. Inc. , Justice O' Connor rejects the concept of 'benign 
racial classifications.' Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U.S.  at 609-10. She noted that 
' [blcnign racial classification' is a contradiction i n  terms. Governmental 
distinctions among citizens based on race or ethnicity, even in the rare 
circumstances permitted by our cases, exact costs and carry with them 
substantial dangers . To the person denied an opportunity or right based 
on race, the classificatio n  i s  hardly benign. The right to equal protection 
of the laws is a personal right, sec Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.  I ,  22, 68 
S .Ct. 836, 846, 92 L.Ed. 1 1 6 1  ( 1 948), securing to each individual an 
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Justice O' Connor argued that the constitutional "standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by 
a particular classification." 105 
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor recognized ' three general propositions' that 
serve as the evolutionary framework for the Court' s equal protection paradigm.106 
Id. 
immunity from treatment predicated simply on membership in a particular 
racial or ethnic group. The Court's emphasis on "benign racial 
classifications" suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from 
harmful governmental uses ofracial criteria. History should teach greater 
humility. Untethered to narrowly confined remedial notions, "benign" 
carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the 
current generation's conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, 
imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable. The 
Court provides no basis for determining when a racial classification fails 
to be "benevolent." By expressly distinguishing "benign" from remedial 
race- conscious measures, the Court leaves the distinct possibility that any 
racial measure found to be substantially related to an important 
governmental objective is also, by definition, "benign." Depending on the 
preference of the moment, those racial distinctions might be directed 
expressly or in practice at any racial or ethnic group. We are a Nation not 
of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities 
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by 
individuals .  Upon that basis, we are governed by one Constitution, 
providing a single guarantee of equal protection, one that extends equally 
to all citizens .  
104 J.A. Croson Co. ,  488 U.S. at 493("Absent searching judicial inquiry in to the 
justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.") 
105 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 494. 
106 Adarand Constructors v .  Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, 223 (1995). Skepticism is the first 
proposition identified b y  Justice O'Connor. Citing a number of opinions, including Justice 
Powell's plurality in Wygant, Justice Burger' s opinion and Justice Stewart's dissent in 
Fullilove. This proposition is defined as " ' [a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria 
must necessarily receive a most searching examination."' Id. at 223. The second 
proposition, as discussed in the text is consistency. Id. Finally, the third proposition is 
congruence which requires the Court to conduct the "[ e ]qua! protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area . . .  the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 224. 
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor noted that the anomalous holding of the Court in 
Metro Broad. Inc., rejected these three general propositions. This inconsistency between 
Metro Broad. Inc. 's application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate race-based 
244 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol . 33 :2  
Of primary importance to her adoption of a color-blind constitutional interpretation 
i s  the second proposition which recognizes the Court ' s  desire for j urisprudential 
consistency107 in its i nterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause . J ustice O' Connor 
argues that constitutional consistency requires that '"the standard of review under 
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or 
b e nefitted by a particular classification, '  [citations omitted] i . e . ,  all racial 
clas sifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly 
scrutinized."108 Ultimately, Justice O ' C o nn or recogn ized the synergistic 
relationship between the individualized n ature of constitutional rights and the 
necessity for removal of racial and ethnic distinctions between such indi viduals in 
order to enforce those rights using a neutral y ard stick. She concluded that 
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all 
derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment s  to the Constitution protect persons, not groups.  It 
follows from that principle that all g overnmental action based on 
race--a grou p  classification long recognized as 'in most 
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,' Hirabayashi, 
[citation omitted]--should be subj ected to detailed judicial inquiry 
to ensure that the personal right to e q u al protection of the laws has 
not been infringed. These ideas h ave l ong been central to this 
Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding 'benign '  
state and federal racial classificatio n s  t o  different standards does 
not square with them. ' [A]  free p eople whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality , '  [citation omitted ] ,  should 
classifications, and the Court' s reliance on the strict scrutiny test serves as the basis for lhe 
Court' s decision to overrule Metro Broad. Inc. See id. at 227. 
107 Adarand, 5 1 5  U.S.  at 229-30. 
Id. 
The principle o f  consistency simply means that whenever the government 
treats any p�r�on unequally because o f  his or her race, that person has 
suffer�d � l�J ury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the 
Co
.
nstitut10� s_ guarantee of equal protection. It says nothing about the 
ultunate va1_1d1ty o: any p�ticular law; that determination is the job of the c?urt applymg �tnct �crutm�. _The principle of consistency explains the circ�ms�nces m 
_
which the mJury requiring strict scrutiny occurs. The 
apphcat1on o f  _stnct sc.ruti�y, in turn, d etermines whether a compelling governmental �nterest J Usttfies the infliction of that injury. 
Consistency does recognize that any individual suffers an inj ury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be. 
1 08 Adarand, 5 1 5  U . S .  at 224. 
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tolerate n o  retreat from the principle that government may treat 
people differently because of their race only for the most 
compellin g  reasons. 109 
245 
The strict scrutiny test -- which requires the Court to find that the racial 
classification is  n arrowly tailored in furtherance of a compelling state interest -- is 
the constitutional y ardstick the Court relies upon to equalize the scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment protections.  Constitutional race neutrality requires that racial 
classifications trigger strict scrutiny notwithstanding their either punitive, 
beneficial, or remedial impact on a particular group. To function as an effective 
measure of constitutional equality, the Court ' s  race neutral constitutional 
interpretation removed the vagaries of j udicial interpretation by incorporating a 
bright line standard i n to the equal protection p aradigm. 1 10 
The Supreme Court' s acceptance of a racially neutral interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause has not gone unchallenged. 1 1 1 The most ardent opponent 
109 Id. at 227. 
110 By eliminating race as a determining factor in the equal protection p aradigm the Court, 
however, also disregards any comparative value j udgment between uneq ual treatment 
imposed on majority and minority group members without regard to the historic or social 
antecedents of such conduct. 
rn Bakke, 438 U.S . at 327 (Brennan, J., White, J . ,  Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., 
concurring)("claims that law must be 'colorblind' or that the datum of race is no longer 
relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration . . . .  for reality rebukes us that race has 
too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities.") 
See also Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. UNIV. J. OF 
URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW 157, 198-99 ( 1998). 
If the Constitution is to be viewed as color-blind, as Justices 
Thomas and Scalia and the Podberesky and Hopwood panels would have 
it, the debate ends at that point. A color-blind Constitution would require 
us to solve the problems of a color-conscious society with color-blind 
solutions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions programs would, thus, 
be totally precluded from considering race as a "plus" or otherwise. 
However, the Constitution as drafted and amended by the Bill of Rights, 
and as interpreted by early case law such as the Dredd Scott decision, was 
not a color-blind document. Instead, it saw Eighteenth Century A merica 
in colors of white, black, red, and yellow, denying citizenship to all but 
the white. Indeed, it protected and guaranteed the institution of s lavery 
into the nineteenth century without actually using the term " slave" or 
"black. " Despite occasional exceptions, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, this 
Constitution gave minorities none of the protections one would expect 
from a color-blind document. 
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of this phi losophy was Justice Thurgood Marsha l l  whose advocacy of an i ntegrated 
society was tempered by knowledge that con t i nu i ng vestiges o f  s lavery were 
operating to prevent African Americans from realizing soc i a l .  pol it ical . and 
economic gains.  1 1 2 At no time was the need for JUd1c1al  interven t 10n into the 
desperate situation faced by African Americans more apparent  than i n the fight to 
preserve race-based affirmative action programs. The Bakke case represented the 
turning point in the Court ' s  util ization of t h e  Eq ual Protection C l ause to remedy 
impact of years of segregation by adopt i n g  a co l or-bl i nd i n t e rpretation of the 
constitution. 
Justice M arshal l voiced his  oppos ition to the Court ' s  color-hi ind 
interpretati on of the c on stitution. He argued that 
Id. 
If onl y  the principle of color-bl i ndne ss had been accepted by the 
maj ority in Plessy in 1 896, we would not be faced w i t h  t h i s  
problem in 1 978. We must re member, however, that this pri nc i p le 
appeared only in the dissent. In the 60 years from Plessy to Brmrn. 
ours was a Nation where, by law ,  i ndi v iduals could be given 
With the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress had a clear 
opportunity to make the Constitution truly color-blind. Congress could 
have included color-blind language, mandating that "no di scrimination 
shall be made on account of race or color. " Such color-blind language 
was presented and debated, but eventually rejected on the grounds of 
political expediency. Congress instead substituted an ambiguous 
standard--equal protection--that would be continuously debated, but 
would have the immediate advantage of attacking the South's Black Codes 
without putting at risk segregated schools or bans on interracial marriages . 
Progress came in the form of affirmative action programs 
designed to remedy the present effects of discrimination in a wide range 
of contexts, and in a manner that could n o t  be color-blind. 
1 1 2 Thurgood Marshall contemplating his decision in Bakke. 
The dream of America as the melting pot has not been realized by 
Negroes - either the Negroes did not get i nto the pot, or he did n o t  get 
melted down. The statistics on unemp loyment and other statistics quoted 
in the briefs ...  document the vast gulf between White and Black America. 
Thal gulf was brought about by centuries of slavery and then by another 
century in which, with the approval of this Court, states were permitted 
to treat Negroes ' specially.' 
PHll.LIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 1 6  
(1 995) (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 1 3 ,  1 978, 
Brennan Papers, Box 465, p. 2-3). 
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'special ' treatment based on race .  For us now to say that the 
principle of color-blindness prevents the Uni versity from giving 
'special' con sideration to race when this Court, in 1 896 licensed 
the states to continue to consider race ,  is to make a mockery of the 
principle of ' equal justice under law . '  1 1 3 
247 
In addi tion to attacking the Court' s disregard for the desperate plight of 
African Americans, Justice Marshall also attacked the notion that ' equality' can 
only be achieved by ignoring group characteristics that result in unequal treatment. 
Although Justice Marshall agreed that group characteristics "were neither 
significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should be treated," 1 1 4 he argued 
that "[ w ]e are not yet al 1 equals, in large part because of the refu sal of the Plessy 
Court to adopt the principle of color-blindness.  It would be cruelest irony for this 
court to adopt the dissent in Plessy now and hold that the University must use color­
blind admissions." 1 1 5 The irony that Justice Marshall recognized has its origin in 
the Court's incorporation of race neutrality into the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Equal Protection Clause was specifically adopted to provide a constitutional barrier 
against state action that maintained the den i grated status of African Americans 
following the Civil War. 
Justice Marshal l ' s  advocacy of racial inclusion within constitutional 
decision-making i s  consi stent with his support of remedial affirmative action 
programs. He noted that 
[i]t is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must 
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race 
in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, 
affluence, and prestige in America. For far too long, the doors to 
those positions have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to 
become a ful l y  integrated society, one in which the color of a 
person ' s  skin will not determine the opportunities available to him 
or her, we must be willing to take steps to open .those doors. I do 
not believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still 
find that a r�medy for the effects of that past is impermissible. 1 16 
1 13 Id. (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 1 3 , 1 978, 
Brennan Papers, Box 465, pp. 1 -2). 1 1 4  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S .  265, 355 ( 1978). 
1 1 5  PHil..LIP J. COOPER, B A  TILES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 17 
( 1 995) (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 1 3 , 1 978, 
Brennan Papers, Box 465 pp. 2-3). 1 1 6  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 40 1 -02. 
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A review of current members of the Court reveals that several notable 
Justices have adopted a strict concept of constitutional race neutrality when 
interpreting the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, 
Justice Clarence Thomas stridently opposes the use of racial classifications by state 
actors . 1 17 He argues that 
these programs may have been motivated, in  part, by good 
intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our 
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the 
basis of race. As far as the Constitution i s  concerned, it is 
irrelevant whether a government' s racial classifications are drawn 
by those who wish to oppress a race or by those thought to be 
disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the paternalism that 
appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war with the 
principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our 
1 17 See Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas 
at the Rubicon, 1 6  LAW & INEQ. J. 429, 482 ( 1998) 
Id. 
The issues become real when posed to Thomas, an African-American, an 
originalist and a miscegcnist. And we hear those i s s ues differently when 
discussed in his voice. Hence, a deep irony: the very act of Justice 
Thomas proclaiming the color-blindness ideal demonstrates the flaw i n  
the principle, itsel f. I n  h i s  capacity as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas 
constitutes the ultimate representation of the law he urges must be color­
blind. Yet, the vastly di fferent voice with which he speaks about the 
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates conclusively  that, at some level, he 
is not blind to color. I am amazed Thomas can be deaf to the difference 
race produces in his own judicial voice. Thomas' color-blindness it 
appears, must be accompanied by an equally poten t  color-deafness. 
But if we remain oblivious to the difference Clarence Thomas' 
color makes, we impoverish our understanding of the issue . In the same 
way, any law professin g  to be 'blind' to the reality of color - Clarence 
Thomas' law - is also i mpoverished. The impoverishment of the law, 
however, is only part of the harm of color-blindness; color-blindness also 
rein forces the foundational premises of assumed white s upremacy. As 
discussed, originalism perpetuates racism by taking race into account in 
the wrong way: it actually renects and places primary emphasis on the 
Framers· white supremac ist racism. Though non-origin alist, color­
blindness also perpetuates racism but in a different way: by failing to 
account for race a race-conscious society. 
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Constitution. 1 1 8  
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Justice Scalia i s  al so an advocate of a strict concept of constitutional color­
blindness that presumptively rej ects all j ustifications for the u se of race-based 
classifications as i l legitimate . With his c haracterization of a racially conscious 
society as one which fosters the creation of a "creditor or a debtor race," 1 1 9 Justice 
Scalia rejects the argument that there could be any constitutionally compelling 
justification for the use of race-based classificati ons. Ju stice Scalia argues that "[i]n 
my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on 
the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite 
direction."120 
1 1 8  Adarand, 5 1 5  U.S .  at 240 (Thomas, J., concuning). 
119  Id. at 239 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring). 
Id. 
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination 
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such 
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the 
Constitution's focus upon the individual, sec Arndt. 1 4, § I  ( " [N )or shall 
any State . . .  deny to any person" the equal protection of the laws) 
(emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see 
Arndt. 15 ,  § 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote "on account of 
race"), or based on blood, see Art. III, §3 ( " [NJo Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood"); Art. I, §9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility 
shall be granted by the United States") .  To pursue the concept of racial 
entitlement--even for the most admirable and benign of purposcs--is to 
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of 
government, we are just one race here. It is  American. 
120 Id. at 239 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 ( 1 989)(Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgement). 
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as 
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the 
source of those effects, which is the tendency--fatal to a Nation such as 
ours--to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country 
of origin or the color of their skin. A solution to the first problem that 
aggravates the second is no solution at all. I share the view expressed by 
Alexander Bickel that ' [t]he lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at 
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, 
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. '  
Id. ; A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 ( 1975) .  At least where state or local action 
is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and 
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ill. REBUTIING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITlJTIONAL !NV ALIDITY 
The color-blind constitutional paradigm requires an initial finding of a 
constitutionally compellingjustification for the u se of ra�e-�as�d c.ri teria. Supreme 
Court case law i s  clear - the goal of remedying present d1scnmmat1on or the effects 
of past discriminatory practices can serve as a basis for u
.
se of  rac_e -based 
classifications . 121 Proof of broad societal discrimination will not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  The discriminatory conduct must have been pe rformed
_ 
by 
the party implementing the race-based remedy. Additionally , strict scrutiny 
mandates that the race-based remedy be narrowly tailored to addre ss the hann 
resulting from such past discriminatory conduct. 
The origin of this analytical paradigm can be traced to Justice Powell ' s  
plurality opinion i n  Bakke. In his opinion J ustice Powell recogn ized the rac ially 
neutral character of the Equal Prote ction Clause, but also acknow ledged that 
compelling justifications for the use of racial c lassifications may be raised. After 
rejecting three of the University ' s justifications as inconsistent with the guarantees 
of the Equal Protection Clause, 122 Justice Powell concluded that the University' s . 
use of racial preferences in Bakke was justified by its attempt to attain a diverse 
limb--for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmatcs, [citation 
omitted]--canjustify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment 
that " [o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens," Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537, 559 ( 1 896)(Harlan, J. ,  dissenting)(citations 
omitted). 
1 21 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 ( l  986)(0' Connor, J . ,  concurring in 
part and concurring in j udgment). ("The Court i s  in agreement that . . .  remedying past or 
present racial discrimination . . .  is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the 
remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.") Pursuant to Justice 
Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.  265 ( 1 978) an 
unresolved question remains regarding the continued permissibility of diversity is a 
compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria. 
122 Bakke, 438 U.S.  at 305-3 1 1 .  Justice Powell decisively rejected the University's use of 
race-based preferences to reduce "the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities 
in medical schools and in the medical profession." Id. at 306. He concluded that the 
Constitution prohibits " [p ]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race 
or ethnic origin . . .  " Id. at 307. He also found that the University could not j ustify its 
program by its efforts to eliminate the effects of societal discrimination. Justice Powell 
argued that in the absence of "constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the 
government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from 
harming another." Id. at 308-09. Finally, Justice Powell did not find any correlation 
between the u��ersity'_s �ace-based _
ad�ssions program and its goal of increasing the 
number of physicians willmg to practice m underserved communities. Id. at 3 1  o. 
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student body . 123 Justice Powell noted that the use of race in this c ontext was "a 
constitutionally permi s sible goal for an institution of higher leaming."124 A 
majority of Court has not, however, adopted this rationale. 125 
Justice Powell also addressed a j ustification for the u s e  of race-based 
classifications that has been more readily accepted by members of the Court. He 
recognized that racial c lassifications used as remedial measures may overcome the 
presumption of constitutional invalidity associated with the use of race-based 
classifications.126 To serve as constitutionall y  permissible j ustifi cation, such use 
must be limited to remedial efforts developed "to redress the wrongs worked by 
123 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1- 1 2. See discussion regarding the importance o f  diversity within 
the academic environment, Bakke, 438 U.S .  at 3 I 1 - 15 ("The forth goal asserted by petitioner 
is the attainment of a di verse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal 
for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically 
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment. ") 
124 Id. at 3 1 1 -12. Note that the university could not s atisfy the additional requirement of the 
standard. 125 See generally Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) 
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by 
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is  not 
a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's 
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented 
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case. Moreover, 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that 
non-remedial s tate interests will never justify racial classifications. 
Finally, the classification of persons on the basis of race for the purpose 
of diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection. 
Id. 
Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this 
issue. While he announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that 
part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale. In Bakke, the word 
"diversity" i s  mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's single-Justice 
opinion. In fact, the four-Justice opinion, which would have upheld the 
special admissions program under intermediate scrutiny, implicitly 
rejected Justice Powell's position. (citations omitted) Thus, only one 
Justice concluded that race could be used solely for the reason of 
obtaining a h eterogenous student body. As the Ada rand Court states, the 
Bakke Court did not express a majority view and is questionable as 
binding precedent. 
126 A state actor may overcome the presumption of invalidity by presenting a "strong basis 
in the evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." J.A. Croson, 488 
U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). 
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specific instances of racial discrimination."127 _
Jus�ice Pow�ll note� tha� " [t]he 
State certainly has a legitimate and substantial �nter�s� m _
am�h?rat�ng, . .  �� 
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified_ 
d1
_
scnrrunat10� . 
Thi s  extremely narrow exception to the strict scrutin y  analysis ts a more . wid�
ly 
accepted justification for the use of race-based classifications than the diversity 
rationale. 129 
In Bakke, Justice Powell relied upon this limited exception to the color­
blind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to reject the Univers�ty ' s 
argument that racial classifications may be u sed to remedy societ�l 
discrimination. 130 He cites several problems associated with efforts to remedy this 
type of societal injury. He initially notes that a societal remedy would impose a 
127 Bakke, 438 U .S. at 307. But see Professor Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and 
Moral Circumstance: Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L.REV . 485 , 5 1 8  
( 1 99 1 ) 
Id. 
Current equal protection doctrine actually may be more 
pernicious than the discredited jurisprudence o f  Plessy. Unlike that 
decision, which accommodated dominant convention at the expense of 
minority interests, current fourteenth amendment j urisprudence impedes 
a political majority, or c ollective bargaining process, when it attempts to 
cure its own past wrongs through remedial legislation. The notion that 
race presumptively cannot be a factor in official action may represent a 
desirable ideal, but it frustrates any constitutional remediation of present 
inequities. By making race unmentionable, even though its presence and 
implications arc pervasive, contemporary equal protection doctrine 
seriously confounds even the most limited aims of the fourteenth 
amendment. Moreover, equal protection jurisprudence not only fails to 
vindicate, but actually impairs, minority interests. 
1 2" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
1 2" There is one primary distinction between the constitutional color-blindness theorized by 
Justice O' Connor and the doctrine advocated by Justice Powell - the extent to w h i c h  the 
presumption of constitutional invalidity may be rebutted .  Justice O'Connor rej ects the 
argument that diversity can serve as a justification for the use of racial classifications. She 
supports the use of racial classi fications in the limited context of remedying particularized 
acts o f  past discriminatory conduct. "Modem equal protection doctrine has recognized only 
one such interest: remedying the e ffects of racial discrimination." Metro Broad. ,  Inc. v. 
FCC
, 
497 U.S.  547, 6 1 2  ( 1 990).  But see Adarand Constructors v.  Pena, 5 1 5  U . S .  200, 239 
( 1 995)  (Scalia. J.. concurring in  part and concurring in judgment). ("In my view, 
government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in 
order to 'make up' for past discrimination in the opposite direction . " )  
I lO Th u . "t d th I f . · c mvcrs1 y argue at one goa o its race-based admissions program w as to 
"counter( ing] the effects of societal discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S.  at 306. 
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burden on innocent individuals in favor of "persons perceived as members of 
relatively victimized groups."13 1  Such a burd e n ,  Powell argues, cannot be imposed 
"in the absence of j udicial , legislative, or admini strative findings of constitutional 
or statutory violations."132 He also places a continuing obligation on the j udiciary 
to monitor the remedy to avoid a remedy that i s  both "ageless" in its application 
and overly broad in scope. 133 "After such fin dings are made, the governmental 
interest in preferring members of the inj ured groups at the expense of others is 
substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated." 1 34 
Justice Powell reiterated this view e ight years later in Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ. , 1 35 fi nding that racial classifications used to remedy societal 
discrimination are too "amorphous a basis" 1 36 for overcoming the constitutional 
presumption of invalidity . 137 He noted in Wygant that 
[n]o one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in 
this countr y .  But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal 
remedies that work against innocent people, soc ietal discrimination 
is insufficient and over expansive. In the absence of particularized 
findings, a c ourt could uphold remedies that are ageless i n  their 
1 31 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 .  ("To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights int o a privilege that all institutions throughout the 
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal 
discrimination.") 
132 Id. at 307. 
133 Id. ("Also, the remedial action usually remains s ubj ect to continuing oversight to assure 
that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the 
benefit.") 
1 34 Id. at 307. 
135 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 ( 1 986). 
1 36 "[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. See also Bakke, 438 U.S.  at 307 ("In the 
school [desegregation] cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs 
worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more focused than 
the remedying of the effects of ' societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept of injury that 
may br ageless in its reach into the past.") 
137 See also Justice Powell' s concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutnick 448 U.S. 448 
(1 980) in which he argued that a Congressionally mandated race-based 'set aside' program 
was justified by Congressional efforts to remedy past discrimination in the area of public 
contracting. Notwithstanding the absence of Congressional, administrative or judicial 
findings of past discrimination, Justice Powell concluded that "Government does have a 
legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination." 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell , J . ,  concurring) . 
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reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the 
future. 138 
Although the body of law in this area continues to develop, Supreme Court 
precedent does offer meaningful guidance for the development and implementation 
of voluntary race-based affirmative action programs aimed at remedying specific 
acts of past discrimination. Although decided on other grounds, t .l'J the Court in 
Wygant began to narrow the parameters of  this exception to the general 
constitutional standard. The Wygant dec i sion resol ved a di spute in Jackson, 
Michigan between the Jackson Board of Education and the Jackson Education 
Association, a teachers union, regarding a p rovis ion in a col lecti ve agreement. The 
disputed provision which was developed to address "racial tension in the 
community"140 provided that in the event l ayoffs became necessary, the Board of 
Education would attempt to achieve a situation in which "at no time will there be 
a greater percentage of minority personnel l aid off than the curren t  percentage of 
minority personnel employed at the time o f  the layoff."14 1  Subsequently, non­
minority teachers, with seniority, who were l aid off fi led an actio n  al leging among 
other violations, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . 1 4 2  
Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion in Wygant in which he 
rejected the School Board ' s  argument that the layoff provis ion was justified to 
"remedy prior discrimination against minorities by the Jackson School District in 
h iring teachers."143 He concluded, in oppo sition to a strong dissent authored by 
Justice Marshall, 144 that in the absence of a factual predicate for a finding of past 
discrimination, such voluntary conduct v iolated the Equal Protection Clause. 
138 Wygant, 476 U.S .  at 276. 
1 39 In prior litigation, "[b ]oth courts concluded that any statistical disparities  were the result 
of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board. The Board now 
c?nt�n�s �at, given anot�er opportunity, i t  could establish the existence of prior 
d1scnrrunat10� . Although th
_
1s argument seems belated at this point in the proceedings, we 
need not cons1de
_
r the question si�ce 
_
we conclude below that the layoff provision was not 
;
���ally appropnate means of ach1evmg even a compelling purpose." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 
140 Id. at 270. 
141 Id. at 270. 
142 Id. at 272. 
143 Id. at 277. 
144 Id. at 295�97. Justice Marshall, joined in his dis sent by Justices Brennan and Blackmun argued that [t]he record and extra-re d 
· l 
' 
th th . 
cor matena s that we have before us persuasively suggest at e plurahty has too quickly assumed the abs · · 
predicate even under th 1 1. , . 
ence of a leg1t1mate factual 
' e P ura tty s own view for affi · . . 
schools." Id. at 297. 
' 
mnative action m the Jackson 
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Justice Powell concluded that "a public employer l ike the Board must ensure that, 
before it embarks on an affirmative action program, it has convincing e vidence that 
remedial action is warranted .  That is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the 
conclusion that there has been prior discrimin ation ."145 
As a result, the plurality ' s  position was that "the trial court must make a 
factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was neces s ary ." 146 Justice O' Connor, in her 
concurrence, refined the plurality ' s  test for evaluating the factual predicate for the 
use of a voluntary affirmative action program by noting that the program may be 
implemented prior to a judicial determination of past discrimination . She noted 
"that a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past discrimination by a court or 
other competent body i s  not a constitutional prerequisite to a public employer' s 
voluntary agreement to an affirmative action program."147 The only prerequisite to 
the implementation of a voluntary program i s  that "the public actor has a firm basis 
for believing that remedial action is required."148 
Justice O'Connor argued that there was merit in the factual predicate set 
forth by the School Board for the imposition o f  the remedial program. She noted 
that "remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor i s  a sufficiently 
weighty state interest to warrant the remedial u se of a carefully constructed 
affirmative action program." 149 The School Board asserted that the purpose 
underlying the remedial program was its "desire to correct apparent prior 
employment discrimination against minorities while avoiding further litigation."150 
145 Wygant, 476 U.S.  at 277. 
146 Id. at 277. 
147 Id. at 289 "A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements does not arise 
with the making of a finding; it arises when the wrong is  committed. Contemporaneous 
findings serve solely as a means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the 
governmental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts 
an affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through 
general societal discrimination. (citations omitted) Such findings, when voluntarily made by 
a public employer, obviously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards of 
value both to nonminority employees and to the public employer itself, should its affirmative 
action program be challenged in court. If contemporaneous findings were required of public 
employers in every case as a precondition to the constitutional validity of their affirmative 
action efforts, however, the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish, 
for they could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important values." Id. at 289-
90. 
148 Id. at 286. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 287. 
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A1though the Court encourages voluntary 1 5 1  efforts to bring s�at� actio
n into 
comp1iance with constitutiona] and statutory m�nda�es, .
both the D1s.t�1c
t Court and 
Court of Appea1s "did not make the proper mqu1ry mto the leg1umacy of the 
d d
. 1 ,
, 1 52 B oard' s  asserte reme ia purpose. 
The standard articulated by Justice Po well in Bakke for determining the 
constitutionality of a state actor' s  ability to i mplement vol untary race-based 
affirmative programs was later tested by the Court in Croson . The dispute in 
Croson originated with the implementation of a racial-preference government 
contracting program by the City of Richmond, V irginia. The program was designed 
to remedy past discrimination in the cons truction indu stry "for the purpose of 
promoting wider participation by minority business enterpri ses in the construction 
of public projects." 153 The Minority B usines s  Uti l ization Plan (the "Plan") required 
general contractors to "subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount o f  the contract 
to one or more Minority Business Enterpri s e s  (MBE' s) . " 1 54 
This case arose as a result of the City ' s  rejection of Croson ' s bid for the 
"provision and installation of certain p1umbi n g  fixtures at the city j ai l . " 155 Although 
Croson attempted at obtain a bid from Continental Metal Hose, a M B E, the MBE's 
bid was higher than those he obtained from other contractors . Acceptance of the 
MBE's bid wou]d have raised the cost of the j ob by $7,663. 1 6, and the City refused 
to increase the contract price to reflect thi s cost. Thereafter, the City refused to 
issue a waiver of the MBE requirement to Croson, and instead rebid the project. 
Croson fi]ed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1 983 cha11enging the constitutionality of 
the Plan "on its face and as applied in thi s  c ase." 156 
The procedural history of this case reveals opposing s chools of thought 
regarding the sufficiency of the City ' s  j u s tificati ons for its race-based remedial 
Plan. The District C o urt' s conclusion w a s  i n  accord with the City ' s  position that 
"national findings of discrimination in the c o n struction industry, when considered 
151 S�e �egents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 43 8 U.S.  265, 364 ( 1 978) ("And our society 
an� J�nsprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the 
ob1ect1ves of the law ") · Wygant 476 U S  290 ("Th 
· 
· J . · 
• .  . • · · at e value of voluntary comphance 1s doubly important �hen It IS a public employer that acts, both because of the example its 
v?lu�� a�suI?pllon of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmental d1scnrrnnatton IS of unique importance. ").  152 Wygant, 476 U . S .  at 293. 153 City of Richmond v.  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 478 ( 1 989) 154 Id. at 477. ' · 
155 Id. at 48 1 .  
1 56 Id. at 483. 
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in conjunction with the statistical study concerning the awarding of prime contracts 
was due to past discrimination ' reasonable . '  "157 The District Court, relying on the 
deferential standard of review of Congressional deci sion-making estab l i shed by the 
Court in Fullilove, upheld the validity of the Plan .  The Fourth C i rcuit  Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court' s decision . The j u stifications articulated by the 
City were viewed as ' reasonable' by both c ourt s .  
A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, together w i t h  the Court's 
intervening decision in Wygant established the basis for an opposing resolution of 
this case. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit' s deci sion, and remanded 
the case for further consideration. Upon a second review, the Fourth Circuit closely 
scrutinized the City' s  j u stifications in accordance with the Wygant decision, and 
ultimately found that the j ustifications could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
On remand, the Fourth Circuit concluded that vol untary race-based programs 
implemented to remedy societal discrimination cannot be justified by "broad-brush 
assumptions of historical discrimination."158 Instead, the City was required to 
demonstrate "prior di scrimination by the government unit involved." 159 
As a threshold matter, the Court concluded that the strict scrutiny test was 
the appropriate evaluative tool for determining the constitutionality of the Plan, 
notwithstanding its remedial purpose. 160 In accordance with the rationale of Bakke, 
Justice O'Connor' s initial inquiry focused o n  whether the City engaged in "judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations" 161 
that would warrant implementation of constitutionally permissible measures to 
remedy past discriminatory conduct. "Only then does the government have a 
157 Id. at 484 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 779 F.2d 1 8 1 ,  1 90 and n. 1 2  (4th 
Cir. 1 985) [hereinafter Croson /]). 
. 
158 Id. at 485 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 882 F.2d 1 355,  1 357 ( 4
l
h Cir. 
1987) [hereinafter Croson //] ) .  
159 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S .  at  485 . ("In this case, the debate at the city council meeting 
'revealed no record of  prior discrimination by the by the city in awarding public contracts 
. . . . Moreover, the statistics comparing the minority population of Richmond to the 
percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms had little or no probative value in 
establishing prior discrimination in the relevant market, and actually suggested 'more of a 
political than a remedial basis for the racial preference. (citations omitted)"). 160 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S .  at 493. "Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke 
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal 
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the 
means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Id. 161 J .A. Croson Co. ,  488 U . S .  at 497. 
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compelling interest i n  favoring one race over another. " 1 0" 
The Court then engaged i n  a c ompreh ensi ve analy s i s  of each specific 
j u stification raised by the City . 1 6.i To support i t s  pri mary j ust i fi cat ion for the Plan, 
the City argued that "there was racial d i scrimi nation in the con struction i ndustry 'm 
th i s  area, and the State, and around the nation . ' "  1 ° 1  J u stice O ' Co n n or art iculated an 
eval uative standard for assessing the unde rlying purpose of a vo l u n tary affirmati ve 
action plan. She stressed that 
[t]he factfinding process of leg i s l ati vc bod ies is general ly ent i t led 
to a presumption of regu l ari ty and deferential re v i e w  by the 
j udiciary . (Citation omitted) But w hen a leg i s lat i ve body c hooses 
to employ a suspect classification,  i t  cannot rest upon a gene ral i zed 
assertion as to the classification ' s  re l e vance to i t s  goal s .  ( C i tation 
omitted) A governmental actor c a nnot render race a l e git imate 
proxy for a particular condi tion mere ly by dec lari ng t hat the 
condition exists. (Citation omi tted) The hi story of rac ial 
classificati ons in this country suggests that bl ind j udicia l  d e feren ce 
to legislati v e  or executive pronouncements of necess i ty has no 
place in equal protection analysi s .  (Citation omi tted ) .  1 65 
The Court noted that statements of discri mi nation "are of l i ttle probative value i n 
establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry ." 1 66 
In Croson, the underlying purpose of thi s Plan was not, however, evidenced by 
particularized past discriminatory conduct sufficient enough to wi thstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
The City also relied on statistical disparities between the number of 
minorities within the construction industry and the population of Richmond to 
162 Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 435 U.S. 265, 308-09 ( 1 978). 163 "The District Court relied upon five predicate ' facts' in reaching its conclusion that there 
was an adequate basis for the 30% quota: ( 1 )  the ordinance declares itself to be remedial· 
(
�
) s
.
ev�ral. 
pr?ponents of t�e �easure state� th
.
eir vi�ws that there h ad been pas; 
d1scnmmat1on m the
.
co
.
nstruct10n
. 
industry; (3) mmonty busmess�s r�ceived 0.67% of prime 
contracts form the city s populauon; (4) there were very few mmonty contractors in local 
and state contractors' associations; and (5) in 1 977, Congress made a determination that the 
effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction industr 
nationally." J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 499. y 1 64 Id. at 500. 165 Id. at 500-01 .  166 Id. at 500. 
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justify its race-based preference program. It supported this justification with the 
Supreme Court' s recognition that appropriate statistical evidence may be indicative 
of discriminatory c onduct. 167 "In the employment context, we have recognized that 
for certain entry level positions requiring minimal training, statistical comparisons 
of the racial composition of an employer' s work force to the racial composition of 
the relevant population may be probative of  a pattern of discrimination ." 1 68 There 
is, however, an exception to this rule . 1 69 Where "special qualifications are 
necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory 
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular 
task."170 This exception proved fatal to the City ' s  ability to justify its remedial 
program. The Court identified several deficiencies in the City ' s  analysis .  It noted 
that the City "does not even know how many MBE' s in the relevant market are 
qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects . 
. . .  Nor does the city know what percentage of  total city construction dollars minority 
finns now receive as subcontractors on prime contracts let by the city ." 17 1  
The Court also noted the lack of evidentiary support for the City ' s  assertion 
that the remedial program was necessary because "white prime contractors simply 
will not hire minority firms."172 The Court ' s  response was simply that "[w]ithout · 
any information o n  minority participation i n  subcontracting, it i s  quite simply 
impossible to evaluate overall minority representation in the city ' s  construction 
expenditures."173 The absence of evidentiary support was also apparent in the 
City's assertion that "MBE membership in local contractors' associations was 
extremely low."174 The City failed to correlate these membership statistics with a 
pattern of racially discriminatory conduct by the City or any p articipant in 
167 See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public S chools, 19 F. Supp.2d 449, 454 ( 1998) 
("Likewise, extremely low percentages of minorities, or non-minorities, in certain public 
schools might raise an inference of discrimination." (Citing Swann v. Mecklenberg Bd. Of 
Ed. , 402 U.S. 1 ,  26 (197 1 )) .  
168 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S.  at 501 . 
169 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 501 . ("There is no doubt that ' [w]here gross statistical 
disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a 
pattern or practice of discrimination' under Title VII. (Citation omitted) But it is equally 
clear that ' [w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to 
the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the 
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.") 
170 J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 501-02. 
171 Id. at 502. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 502-03 . 
174 Id. at 503. 
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Richmond' s construction industry. 
For low minority membership in these associations to be relevant, 
the city would have to link it to number of local MBE' s eligible for 
membership.  If the statistical disparity between eligible MBE's 
and MBE membership were great enough, an inference of 
discriminatory exclusion could arise .  In such case, the c ity would 
have a compell ing interest in preventing its tax dollars from 
assisting these organizations in maintaining a racially segregated 
construction market. 175 
The final j ustification for Richmond' s  remedial plan was summarily 
dismissed by the Court. The Court stated that the "probative value" of the City's  
assertion that "there had been nationwide discrimination in the construction 
industry was extremely limited."176 Justice O 'Connor in Croson concluded that 
"[w]hile the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they 
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of 
prior discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use 
race-conscious rel ief."1 77 In addition to not being narrowly tailored, 1 78 the Court 
held that 
1 1s Id. 
none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified 
discrimination in the Richmond c onstruction industry . We, 
therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities  on the 
basis of race.  To accept Richmond' s  claim that past societal 
discrimination alone can serve as  the basis for rigid racial 
preferences would be to open the door to competing c laims for 
'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a 
Nation of equal citizens in  a society where race is irrelevant to 
personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of 
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable c laims of 
past wrongs.  'Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the 
prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority 
gro�ps. Those whose societal inj ury i s  thought to exceed some 
arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential 
176 I.A. Croson Co. ,  488 U.S .  at 504. 1 77 Id. 
178 Id. at 507-08. 
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classifications . . . .  ' (Citation omitted) We think such a result w ould 
be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision 
whose central command is equality . 1 79 
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The Court' s willingness to recognize that remedying specific acts of past 
1iscrimination can serve as a constitutionally c ompelling justification for the use 
lf race-based classifications was also addre s se d  in Ada rand. This  case represents 
he culmination of 1 7  years of Supreme Court litigation on this issue . The j udgment 
ssue by the Court in this  case represents one of few unified pronouncements from 
.he Court on the standard of review required to e valuate equal protection challenges 
.o race-based affirmative action programs. 
In Adarand, the plaintiff submitted the l owest bid to supply guardrails on 
a federal highway construction project. The contract was instead awarded to a 
Hispanic contractor who was certified by the Small Business Administration as 
"socially and economically disadvantaged." 1 80 The subcontractor' s certification 
made the prime contractor eligible for a financial incentive program available only 
to general contractors who hired companies  controlled by disadvantaged 
individuals. The equal protection challenge to the government' s financial incentive 
program raised by the plaintiff was defeated on a motion for summary judgment. 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the lenient standard of review for federal race­
based preferences established by the Court i n  Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, 
affirmed the District Court' s decision. 181 
On appeal, the Supreme Court finally reached a consensus regarding the 
standard of review appropriate for assessing the constitutionali ty of federally 
mandated racial classifications. Justice O'Connor initially rej ected any language 
set forth in Metro Broadcasting or Fullilove that suggested that an intermediate 
level of scrutiny i s  the appropriate standard of review for e valuating the 
constitutionality of governmental racial classifications. The Adarand decision also 
broadened the holding in  Croson by making strict scrutiny analysis applicable to 
classifications used by federal government actors . 1 82 In this regard, the Court held 
179 Id. at 505-06. 
180 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515  U.S. 200, 205 ( 1 995). 
1 8 1  Id. at 210. 
182 Id. at 222. 
With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local 
governments. But Croson of course had no occasion to declare what 
standard of review the Fifth Amendment requires for such action taken by 
the Federal Government. Croson observed simply that the Court' s 
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that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a re�ie':ing court �oder strict scrutiny. 
In other words, such classifications are c o n st1tut10nal only if they are narrowly 
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests ." 183 
The Court further noted that the standard of review for equal protection 
cl aims was not dependent upon the identity of the governmental decision-maker. 
Specifically, the Court resolved the question that arose after Fullilove regarding 
whether the Court should afford j ud i cial deference when reviewing the 
constitutionality of Congressionally mandated racial classifications. Justice 
O' Connor clarified the Court's  position by c oncluding that "to the e xtent (if any) 
that Fullilove hel d  federal racial classifi c ations to be subject to a less rigorous 
d d 
. 
. 1 11 · , , 1 84 stan ar , it is no onger contro mg. 
The Court was al so challenged to articulate circumstances in which it would 
find a compelling j ustification for the u s e  o f  race-based classification capable of 
falling within the exception to the concept o f  c onstitutional color-blindness that had 
permeated the Court' s post-Bakke dec i s i on s  on affirmative action. Justice 
O'Connor specifically responded to the c omplaint raised by Justice Marshall in 
Fullilove that "strict scrutiny is ' strict i n  theory, but fatal in fact."' 185 Although a 
strong advocate of constitutional color-bl i n dness,  J ustice O' Connor acknowledged 
that race neutrality has not fully integrated itself into the social fabric of American 
society. She noted that "[t]he unhappy p ersistence of both the practice and the 
l ingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is 
an unfortunate reality, and government i s  n ot di squalified from acting in response 
to it."1 s6 
. . 1:1nfortunately, the Court did not have an opportunity t o  ful l y  address this issue m light of the lower courts' failure t o  apply a heightened standard of proof to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the race-based components of the SBA' s 
government contracting program. 187 As a result of its deci sion to overrule Metro 
Id. 
·�eatm�nt of an exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be d1spos1t1ve here,' because Croson 's facts did not implicate Congress'  broad power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1 83 ld. at 227. 
1 84 Id. at 235 . 
185 Id at 237 ( · F · quotmg ulllove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.  448 5 1 9  ( 1 980) l d by Adarand Constructors v Pena 5 1 5  U S  
' , overru e . 
186 Adarand, 5 1 5  U . S .  a� 237. ' . .  200, ( 1 995) (Marshall J. ,  concurring)). 187 Id. at 237. 
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Broadcasting and Fullilove, Justice O' Connor remanded Adarand to the District 
Court for a determination of whether the government's use of racial classifications 
was justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to achieve the goals 
articulated by the program in accordance with the strict scrutiny analysis. 188 
IV. CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 
Although few would argue that race discrimination or even the vestiges of 
past de Jure discrimination have been eliminated from the American framework, the 
ability to substantiate such claims is increasingly difficult. We no longer live under 
a system of Jim Crow laws that clearly identify the players . In the absence of the 
188 0 
Because our decision today alters the playing field in some important 
respects, we think it best to remand the case to the lower courts for further 
consideration in light of the principles we have announced. The Court of 
Appeals, following Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, analyzed the case 
in terms of intermediate scrutiny. It upheld the challenged statutes and 
regulations because it found them to be 'narrowly tailored to achieve 
[their] significant governmental purpose of providing subcontracting 
opportunities for small disadvantaged business enterprises.' 1 6  F.3d, at 
154 7 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals did not decide the question 
whether the interests served by the use of subcontractor compensation 
clauses are properly described as 'compelling.' It also did not address the 
question of narrow tailoring in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by 
asking, for example, whether there was 'any consideration of the use of 
race-neutral means to increase minority business participation' in 
government c ontracting, Croson, supra, at 507, 109 S.Ct., at 729, or 
whether the program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last 
longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate,' 
Fullilove, supra, at 5 1 3, 1 00 S.Ct., at 2792-2793 (Powell, J., concurring). 
n remand, the District Court in Adarand concluded that although findings of past 
discrimination in the federal construction contracting industry served as a compelling 
justification for Congressional implementation of race-based set-asides, the program was not 
narrowly tailored enough to overcome the strict s crutiny analysis. 
I conclude that the statutes and regulations implicated in the SCC 
program, with respect to the races included as presumptively 
disadvantaged, do not provide a reasonable assurance that the application 
of racial criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives 
of Congress . . . .  As such, they are not narrowly tailored to serve the interest 
of eliminating discrimination in the construction industry. 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F.Supp. 1 556, 1581 ( 1 997). This decision was, 
however, vacated with directions to dismiss by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 169 F.3d 
1292, 1299 (1 999). 
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proverbial smoking gun, t h e  Court's  color-blind interpr�tatio� of the eq�al 
protection paradigm serves as substantial barrier to the continued 1mplementat10n 
of race-based remedial affirmative action programs.  However, there are several 
ways to defeat the argument that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, fatal in fact . "  
The first option available to race-based affi rmative action proponents has 
littl e pragmatic appeal. Using a strategy reminiscent of the one utilized by the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the 1 940's to end school desegregation, public 
institutions of higher education could be encouraged to implement race-based 
remedial affirmative action programs in response to litigation challenging the 
val idity of their existing admis sions programs . 1 89 Similar legal challenges i n  t h e  
area of municipal hiring have resulted i n  voluntary race-based affirmative action 
programs sanctioned by the courts through consent decrees. 1 90 Unfortunate) y, the 
inefficiency of this strategy is readily apparent. In addi tion to being costly and time 
consuming, educational institutions are well aware of the judicial and statutory 
pro hibitions on racially discriminatory practices. The least of which is Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 1 9 1  which if violated may result in the elimination of 
189 See generally, Motion to Intervene filed on behalf of minority students and affinnativc 
action proponents in the cases filed by Gratz and Grutter again st the University of Michigan . 
Al though the District Court denied their motions to intervene i n  the cases brought by Gratz 
and Grutter challenging the race-based admissions programs utilized by the University's 
Col lege of Literature and Law S chool, the Sixth Circuit i ssued an opinion in which it 
consolidated these cases for the purpose of reversing the District Court's deci sion , and 
allowing the minority defendants to intervene in the action. The Sixth Circuit concluded that 
the intervention would permit the introduction of "evidence of past discrimination by the 
University itsel f or ofthe disparate impact of some current admissions criteria, and that these 
may be important and relevant factors in determining the legality of a race-cons c i ous 
admi s sions policy . "  Grutter v.  Bol linger 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6'h Cir. 1 999). See also action 
filed by civil rights groups on behal f of African American, Hispanic and Fi lipino students 
against the University of California at Berkeley on Feb. 2, 1 999. The suit alleges that 
Berkeley's admissions policies v iolate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 and have an 
unju stified disparate impact on minority applicants. Seth Rosenfeld, UC-Berkeley sued over 
minority admissions, San Francisco Examiner, February 3, 1 999, at A 7; Sara Hebel, Bias in 
admissions charged at Berkeley, Chron. Of Higher Educ .,  February 1 2, 1999, at A37.  
I'XJ See generally, Local N o .  93, Intern. Ass' n  of Firefighters, AFL-CIOC.L.C. v.  City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S.  501  ( 1 986); Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of 
Boston, 1 4  7 F.3d 13  ( I "  Cir. 1 998) ;  McNamara v. City of Chicago, 1 38 F.3d 1 2 1 9  (Th Cir. 
1998) ;  U nitcd States v. City of Miami, 1 1 5 F.3d 870 ( 1 1 'h Cir. 1 997). 
1 9 1  The provisions of Title VI arc not all punitive. The regulations issued by the Department 
of Education governing the administration of Title VI provide that educational institutions 
may vol untarily implement affinnative action programs to either "overcome the effe c ts of 
prior di scrimination" due to "race, color, or national origin . "  "Even in  the absence of past 
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much needed federal fun ding. In this regard, e ven if evidence of past d i scrimination 
existed, prudent educational institutions would be compelled to challenge every 
attempt at making such an admission in order to avoid liabi l ity .  
As a re sul t, the only remaining avenue for relief i s  to seek Congressional 
intervention and implementation of race-based remedial action for instances of 
discrimination and to eradicate the continuin g effects past discrimination in both the 
public and private sectors of h igher education. 192 The Court has previously 
discrimination, Title VI provides that educational institutions may implement voluntary 
measures aimed at overcoming the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting 
participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin."  34 CFR 
§100.3(b)(6)(i)-(iii) (1990). 
1 92  For a discussion of justifications for government mandated affirmative action program 
designed to address private discrimination in the area of government contracting, see Ian 
Ayres and Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative 
Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 577 (November, 1 998).  Sec also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., 
NOT AU. BLACK AND WH ITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALVES 177 
( 1 996). 
A government-imposed preference might be thought more acceptable on 
the theory that, i f  the justification for a preference embodies important 
principles and aspirations, then government should lead; that regulating 
abuses is not enough. Moreover, the aspiration of inclusion . . .  has most 
weight as regards public institutions where it is seen to be democratic and 
to promote civic community. On the other hand, given that preferences 
have a moral cost, some will argue that the moral injury is more grievous 
if inflicted by one's own government - by the power of the state. This 
latter view is currently the law, because the constitutional scrutiny of 
government affirmative action is tougher than say, Title VII scrutiny of 
private employer efforts. This approach honors private autonomy, but 
also signals some moral ambivalence, making racial preferences wrong 
for one actor but acceptable for another - wrong when people act 
collectively through government; but acceptable when they act personally . 
. . .  This is unsatisfying. Surely i f  the s tate stands idly by while my 
neighbor injures me, I have strong grounds for complaint. The private­
public distinction does not and cannot definitely resole the issue of our 
responsibilities to one another. What works, in my view, is to engage in 
the moral conversation about what those responsibilities are; then, having 
decided, ask what enforcement mechanisms are appropriate in light of a 
variety of considerations - practicality, ethics, custom. It may be that we 
decide to leave enforcement to social norms and informal community 
standards of civility, or to religious or other community institutions. Or 
we may decided that the state should be involved in a regulatory capacity. 
In race as in smoking, obscenity, abortion and elsewhere: we should not 
266 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol . 33:2 
recognized that race-based affirmative action programs implemented by State 
governments may withstand constitutional scruti�� if they are des�gn�d �o r�me�li 
past discrimination or the present effects o f  spec1f1c acts of past d1scnmmat1on . 
If narrowly tailored, such programs may rebut the presumption of constitutional 
infirmity inherent in the use of such an i nvidious classification as race. Although 
the Court has eliminated race from the equal protection paradigm, the Court is not 
foreclosed from utilizing race-based remedial measures to counter the effects of past 
discriminatory practices. 194 
make the typical lawyer's error o f  confusing the question of what is right 
with the decision about the role of government. 
Id. For an alternative avenue of redress which relics on the intervention of the Executive 
Branch of government, see, How President Clinton Could Advance the Higher Educational 
Opportunities of Black Americans, 1 6  JOURNAL OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 50 ( 1 997). 
If president Clinton is serious about retaining affirmative action in, as he 
says, a 'repaired' form, he has it within his powers to form a commission 
of highly respected citizens and legal advocates to make the most 
powerful possible case before the Supreme Court for the constitutionality of affirmative action procedures. Properly armed with facts and hard sociological data on the favorable i mpact of affirmative action on American society, these experts will  make a compelling brief for the proposition that affirmative action i s  in the public interest. 
Id. 
. President Clinton could also instruct the Justice Department to use. its hu?e l�g_
al resources to enter, on the side of black people and other racial
_ n:u
no�ttes, every pending case raising the issue of the constttut1onahty of racial preference s .  
193 Wygant v .  Ja�ks�n �d. of Educ.,  476 U.S.  267, 29 1 ( 1 986) (O'Connoe J . ,  concurring in part and eoncumng m J udgment). 
Indeed, our.recognitio� of the responsible state actor' s competency to take these steps i s  assumed m our recognition of the States' constitutional duty 
Id. 
to take affirmative steps to el' 
· h · · . . . . . unmate t e contmumg effects of past unconstttutional discnmmation. 
194 Fulllove v. K.lutznick 448 u s  448 48 Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200 ( 1 995) (M 
· 
· 
' 2 ( 1 98?), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. 
the remedial conte
�t the Con 
arshall J . ,  conc�mng)). ("[W]e reject the contention that in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Meckle b
gress
B
must act 10 a wholly 'color-blind' fashion" (quoting 
( 197 1 )). See also, Wygant 4;6
u
�
g
S 
oa
;d of Education 402 U.S. 1 ,  1 8-2 1 ,  9 1  S .  Ct. R67 
to remedy the effects of pn
'.0 d. 
· 
. 
· a
_
t S0-8 1 . We have recognized, however, that in order r 1scnmmation i t  b . As part ofthis Nation ' s d d' . . 
' may e necessary to take race mto account. e 1cat1on to eradicati · 1 . . . be called upon to bear some f th b 
ng racia discnmmation, innocent persons may o e urden of the remedy. 
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A. Congressional Remedial Authority 
A threshold question that must be re sol ved prior to the implementation of 
any Congressionally mandated race-based remedial affirmative action programs is 
whether the Constitution authorizes Congress to engage in efforts to ameliorate 
discriminatory practices in the private as well as the public sector of higher 
education. Although j udicial inquiry into the e xtent of Congre ss' remedial powers 
is not novel , the issue remains unresolved b y  t h e  Court. Questions regarding the 
extent of Congressional remedial powers were rai sed almost twenty years ago in 
Fullilove. In Fullilove the Court addressed the extent of Congressional authority 
to impose remedial measures designed to el imin ate racial discrimination i n  federal 
contracting and procurement programs . 1 95 In the pl urality opinion, Justice Burger 
concluded that 
[i]t is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal , 
does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in 
Congress, expressly charged by the C on stitution with competence 
and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not 
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with 
existing federal statutory or constitutional antidi scrimination 
provisions, but also, where Congres s  has authority to declare 
certain conduct unlawful, it may, as h ere, authorize and induce 
state action to avoid such conduct. 1 96 
Although the Adarand decision overturned Fullilove due to the Court's  
failure in Fullilove to apply strict scrutiny t o  e v aluate the constitutionality of the 
minority set-aside program at issue in the case, the Court has never repudiated 
Justice Burger' s  interpretation of Congress' s remedial authority in this area. 197 For 
195 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 459 . The stated objective of the minority set aside program at 
issue in Fullilove was "to direct funds into the minority business conununity, a sector of the 
economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience 
with Government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from 
the public works program as then formulated." Id. 
196 Id. at 483-84. 197 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515  U.S. 200, 235 ( 1 995). 
Id. 
Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal 
racial classifications to be subj ect to a less rigorous standard, it is  no 
longer controlling. But we need not decide tody whether the program 
upheld in Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases 
have defined it. 
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example, Justice O 'Connor echoed this Constitutional philosophy in Croson. She 
noted that 
Congress, u nlike any State or pol itical subdivision, has a specific 
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The power to 'enforce '  may at times also include the 
power to define situations which Congress determines threaten 
principles of equality and to adopt prophy lactic rules to deal with 
those situations. 1 98 
The origin of  the Congressional authority referred to by Justices Burger and 
O' Connor is found i n  §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which gives Congress the 
power to enforce its provisions "by appropriate legislation . " 1 99 Justice Powell, in 
discussing the legislative history of the post-Civil War Amendments, noted 
specifically that "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have contemplated 
that Congress, rather than the federal c ourts, would be the prime force behind 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment." To date, the Court has not articulated 
the scope of this power,200 but it i s  clear that such Congressional power is 
reviewable by the judiciary, and as such must conform to the mandates of the 
Court' s interpretation of the equal protection paradigm .20 1 Notwithstanding 
l ingering questions  about the scope of Congressional remedial power, one fact is 
c lear. Any governmental use of racial c lass ifications, whether uti l i zed by city, state, 
federal, or Congressional authority, must c omply with the strict scrutiny analysis . 
198 City of Richmon d  v. J.A. Croson Co., 4 88 U.S.  469 478 ( 1 989). 
199 ' See Katzenbach v .  Morgan, 384 U.S. 64 1 ,  6 5 1 ( 1 966). 
Id. 
Th�s t�e · ,  . .  standard is the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate 
�egislati.o� under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Correctly viewed, 
§5 
�s a �ositi�e grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise 
its discretion in  determining whether and what legislation is needed to 
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
200 Adarand, 5 1 5  U . S .  at 230. 
Id. 
It is true �at various Members of this Court have taken different views of 
the aut�onty S 5 o f  the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to 
deal with the problem of racial discrimination
, and the extent to which co�rts should defer lo Congress' exercise of that authority [citation omitt�dl. We need not, and do not, address these differences t�day For �w,
b
it i s  
f
eno
_
ugh to observe that J ustice Stevens' sugges tion tha
.
t any em er o this Court has repud· t d 
· th' . . ta e m is case his or her previously expressed views on the subject post at 2 1 23 2 1 25 2 1 27 . . • - , , i s  incorrect. 
201 See Justice Powell' s · . . . concumng opm1on m Fullilove, 448 U.S.  at 509. 
2000] PRIVATE PROBLEM, PUBLIC SOLUTION 269 
As the Court in Adarand held, the equal protection paradigm requires that "such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are n arrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests ."202 
Justice O'Connor's willingness to apply strict scrutiny with equal force to 
remedial legislation promulgated by state or federal actors has been severely 
criticized. In his dissenting opinion in Adarand, J ustice Stevens argues that such 
application ignores the "practical and legal differences between federal and state or 
local decisionmakers . "203 He argues that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
empowers the federal government to enact legislation aimed at eliminating "historic 
racial subjugation. "204 As such, judicial deference must be expended to the exercise 
of the federal decision-making authorized in furtherance of this mandate. He argued 
that such deference is a necessary weapon in the fight to eliminate racial 
discrimination: 
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the 
same time it expressly limits the S tate s .  This is no accident. It 
represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience 
throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the Federal 
Government must be the primary defender of racial minorities 
against the States, some of which may be inclined to oppress  such 
minorities. A rule of 'congruence' that ignores a purposeful 
'incongruity'  so fundamental to our system of government is 
unacceptable. 205 
One proposition which served as the basis for Justice O'Connor's decision 
in Adarand to apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the use of racial classifications by 
federal actors focused on the need for congruence between the equal protection 
202 da A rand, 5 1 5  U.S.  at 227. 
203 Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
An additional reason for giving greater deference to the National 
Legislature than to a local law-making bady is that federal affirmative­
action programs represent the will o f  our entire Nation's elected 
representatives, whereas a state or local program may have an impact on 
nonresident entities who played no part in the decision to enact it. Thus, 
in the state or local context, individuals who were unable to vote for the 
local representatives who enacted a race-conscious program may 
nonetheless fell the effects of that program. 
Id. at 252. 
204 Id. at 252. 
205 Id. at 255. 
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analysis required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
206 Justice Steve n s ,  
however, argued that Justice O'Connor's rule o f  congruence i gnores the fundamental 
distinction between the broad national decision-making authority of the fed eral 
govern ment, and the limited scope of state legislatures to the detriment of programs 
aimed at furthering the goal s of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 Justice O'Connor 
countered this argument by noting that the principles of equality are furthered b y  
app l y i n g  t h e  same exacting standard o f  review, notwithstanding the branch of . h d " "  ak. 208 government serving as t e ec1s1on-m er. 
z .. , Sec J ustice O'Connor discuss ion regarding congruence in Ada rand, 5 l 5 U.S.  at 224. 
1'" Ju stice S te vens. dissent, Adarand, 5 1 5  U.S. at 253. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .  
Prcsumahly, the majority is now salislied that i ts  theory of  'congruence' 
hctwccn the suhstantivc rights provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
/\ mcndmcnts disposes o r  the objection based upon d i  vidcd constitutional 
powers . But il is one thing to say (as no one seems to dispute) that the 
h fth Amendment encompasses a general guarantee o f  equal protection as 
broad as that contained within the Fourteenth Ame ndment. It is another 
thing entirely to say that Congress' institutional competence and 
const i t utional authori ty entitles it to no greater deference when i i  enacts 
a program designed to foster equality than the deference due to a State 
legislature. 
�'" lcl. at 210-1 1 (O' Connor, J . ) .  
J ustice Stevens also claims that we have ignored any di fference between 
federal and slate legislatures. But requiring that Congress, like the States, 
enact racial c lassi fications only when doing so is necessary to further a 
'compel ling interest' docs not contravene any pri nciple o f  appropriate 
respect ror a coequal hranch of the Government. It is true that various 
Members or this Court have taken di fferent views o f  the a uthority §5 of 
the Founecnth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the 
problem of racial discri mination, and the ex.tent t o  which courts should 
defer lo Congress' exercise of that authority .  See, e.g., Metro 
Broadcasting. Inc. v. FCC. 497 U.S. 547, 605-06 ( 1 975) (O'Connor, J.,  
dissenting): City of Richmond v .  J.A. Croson Co.,  488 U.S .469, 486-93 
< O'Connor. J . .  Rehnqu i st, C.J. ,  and While, J . )  (Kennedy, J . ,  concurring 
in part and concurring in j udgment) (Scalia. J ., concurring in judgment) ; 
Ful l ilove �-. Klutznick . .  448 U .S .  448. 472-73 ( 1 980) ( Burger, C.J .)  
! Powell.  J . .  concurri ng) ( S tewart. J . .  dissenting).  We need not, and do 
not. address these di ffere nces today. For now, it is enough to observe that 
J us ucc Stevens' suggestion that any Memher of thi s  Court has repudiated 
in lhi �  case h is or her previous l y  ex.pressed views on the subject, post, at 
2 1 2 .\ .  2 1 25 .  2 1 21. i s  incorrect. 
Id. at 2 .\ 0 - �  I 
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Notwithstanding this criticism, the Court has,  however, acknowledged that 
Congressional legi slati ve power is broader t h an that which may b e  e xercised by 
state and local governments . Justice O ' C onnor recognized this d i stinction in 
Croson, when she noted that "Congres s  may i dentify and redress the effects of 
society-wide discrimination does not mean t h at ,  a fortiori, the States and their 
political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate."209 The 
scope of Congressional p ower has clearly been d i stinguished from that held by other 
political entities . In Bakke, the Court noted t h at the University ' s  "broad mission is 
education, not the fonnulation of any legi s l ative policy or the adj udication of 
particular claims of i l legality."210 This l ack of national legislative authority 
prevented the University from implementing remedial affirmati ve action measures 
designed to address soci etal discrimination.21 1 Congress,  on the other hand, is not 
only authorized, but expected to fulfill the mand ated of the Fourteenth Amendment 
by addressing discri mination on a national scope. In Bakke, Justice Powell 
concluded that "[b ]efore relying upon these s orts of findings in establi s hing a racial 
classification, a governmental body must have the authority and capability to 
establish, in the record, that the classification i s  responsive t o  identified 
discrimination. "212 
This position was also expressed by Justice Powell in his concurrence in 
Fullilove. 1n drawing the distinction, he noted that "[t]he hi story of this Court' s 
review of congressional action demonstrates beyond question that the national 
Legislature is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations."213 He thus 
concluded that "it is beyond question, therefore , that Congress has the authority to 
identify unlawful discriminatory practices, t o  prohibit those practices, and to 
prescribe remedies to eradicate their continuing effects."214 
B. Strict Scrutiny A nalysis: 
1 .  Compelling state intere st 
It is axiomatic that the goal of remedying past discrimination or the present 
209 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U . S .  469, 490 ( 1 989). 
210 Regents of the Univ . of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.  265, 309 ( 1 978). 21 1 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 ("Petitioner does not p urport to have made, and is in no position 
to make, such findings."). 
212 Id. 
21 3 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 ( Powell, J. concurring). 214 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 ( 1 9 80), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, 235 ( 1 995) (Powell, J. concurring). Id. at 502. 
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ffects of past discriminatory practices2 1 5  c a n  serve as a basis for use of race-based e
lassifications.2i6 Prior to the development and implementation of a race-based 
�ffirmative action program, Congress must e stablish a "strong basis in evidence for 
its conclusion that remedial action was nece s s ary. "2 1 7  Thus it would require proof 
of the existence of prior discrimination or the present effects o f  discrimination 
within the field of higher education .2 1 8  As J u stice Powel l  noted in Bakke, "[t]he 
State certainly h as a legitimate and substantial intere st in ameliorating, or 
215 Definition of present effects of past discrimination: 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 1 53 (4th Cir. 1994) ('To have a present effect of past 
discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party seeking lo implement the program 
must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and 
that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to j ustify the program."). 
21 6 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 ( 1 986) (O' Connor, J. concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) ("The Court is in agreement that . . .  remedying past or 
present racial discrimination . . .  is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the 
remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program."); See also Id. at 274 
(Powell, J. plurality) ("This Court has never held that societal discrimination alone is 
sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing 
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of 
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."); Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J. 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The Court is in agreement that, whatever 
the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor 
is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed 
affirmative action program."); Fullilove, 448 U.S.  at 497 (Powell, J .  concurring) ("The 
Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified 
discrimination."). 
217 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 ( 1 986). 
218 Congress together with the Federal Communications Commission, made a similar finding 
of past discrimination in the field of mass communications. In Metro Broadcasting, the �CC promulgated a program to encourage minority participation in communications 
mdus�'. Altho�gh the case primarily focused on the attainment of diversity as a const1tut10nal basis for the FCC's preferential incentive program, the FCC and Congress 
also argued that there was a remedial basis for the program. 
Congres� fo_un� �at '�he effects or past inequities stemming from racial 
a�d e1?�1c �iscnmmation have resulted in  a severe underrepresentation of 
mmonties m the media of mass communications. '  Citations omitted. 
Co��ress �d the Comr:nssion �o not j usti fy the minority ownership pohc1es strictly as remedies for victims of this discrimination, however. Ra��r, C�ngr�ss and the FCC have selected the minority ownership pohcie.s pn�az:ly to promote programming diversity, and they urge that such diversity is an importa t · · . . n governmental objective that can serve as a constituhonal basis for the preference policies Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v.  FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 ( j990). 
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eliminating where feasible,  the disabling effects o f  i dentified discrimination."2 19 He 
further noted that the C ourt has "never approv e d  a classification that aids persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other 
innocent individuals i n  the absence of judicial ,  legislati ve, or administrative 
findings of constituti onal or statutory violat i o n s."220 There is an unresolved 
question regarding the scope and speci ficity required of such Congressional 
findings. 
Justice Powel l  has, however, provided gui dance in this area. He stated that 
the "degree of specificity required in the fi ndi ngs o f  di scrimination and the breadth 
of discretion in the choice of remedies may v ary with the nature and authority of a 
governmental body."221 Congress as a nati o n al governing body has broader 
investigative and remedial powers than munici pal or state governments. The Court 
has approved this deferential approach to Congre ssional decision-making .222 For 
example, strict scrutiny analysis rej ects the argument that societal di scrimination 
can also serve as a compelling justification for the use of race-based remedial 
measures. Justice Powell  in Wygant argued that the Court requires "some showing 
of prior discrimination by the governmental u n i t  involved before allowing l imited 
219 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U . S .  265, 307 ( 1 978). 220 Id. "Before relying upon these sorts of findings i n  establishing a racial classification, a 
governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the 
classification is responsive to identified discrimination . " Id. at 309. See also Justice Powell, 
plurality opinion in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 ("In the absence of particularized findings, a 
court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their 
ability to affect the future."). Justice O' Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment in Wygant, 476 U.S.  at 286 ("This remedial purpose need not be accompanied by 
contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as long as 
the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required."). 221 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.  448, 5 1 5  (1 980), (Powell, J . ,  concurring) overruled by 
Adarand Constructors v .  Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200 (1995).  222 Id. at 472. 
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial 
context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our 
task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch 
charged by the Constitution with the power to "provide for the . . .  
general Welfare of the United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, "  the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Art. I, §8, cl. I ;  Arndt. 1 4, § 5 .  
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U . S .  at 563 ("We explained [in Fullilove] that deference was 
appropriate in light of Congress' institutional competence as the National Legislature . . . as 
well as Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause . . , the Spending Clause, . . .  , and 
the Civil War Amendments."). 
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use ofracial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."223 In defining 
"societal" discrimination, Justice O'Connor points out that it is "discrimination that 
i s  not traceable to [government agency ' s] own actions."m 
To the extent that Congress, through the exercise of its legislative authority, 
engaged in specific acts of discrimination, Congress may use race-based measures 
to eliminate the effects of those acts. However, Congressional remedial authority 
may also come into play if Congress  was a "passive participant" in the 
discriminatory c onduct of others, and acts to alleviate the cff ects of that conduct as 
well. The basis for the Court' s reasoning in this regard can be found in the exercise 
of the government' s  spending powers. The Court has previously established that 
government entities may intervene to eliminate racially discriminatory structures 
that receive public financing. In Croson, the Court held that " I i  ]t is beyond dispute 
that any public entity, state or federal,  has a compel ling interest in assuring that 
public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to 
finance the evil of  private prejudice. "225 
In expanding on the connection between the exercise of  spending powers 
and Congressional remedial authority previously discussed in Croson, the Court in · 
Fullilove noted that 
Congress was exercising its powers under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in making a finding that past discrimination would 
cause federal funds to be distributed in  a manner which reinforced 
prior patterns of discrimination.  While the States and their 
subdivisions may take remedial action when they posses s  e vidence 
th�t th.eir ?"".n s�ending practices are exacerbating a pattern of 
pnor �1scnrm�at10n, they must identify that discrimination,  public 
or pnvate, with some specificity before they may u se race­
conscious relief. 226 
�h� Court has had several opportunitie s  to apply the "passive participant" 
theory within the c ontext of determining the constitutionality of race-based remedial 
measures. In Croson the Court n t d th " "f · . . ' o e at t the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive part· · 
' · 
b 1 t f h 1 
icipant m a system of racial exclusion practiced 
y e emen s o t e ocal construct· · d · · ion m u s  try, we thmk It clear that the city could 
223 Wygant, 476 U . S .  at 274. 
224 Id. at 288 (O' Connor J concurri . 22s City of Richmond v. iA'. Croson �� m4��t and concurring in judgment). 226 Id. at S04. · • U.S.  469, 492 ( 1 989). 
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take affirmative steps to dismantle such a sy stem. "227 Also, in Fullilove, Congress 
approved a $4 billion state and 1oca1 public works bi1l that included a 1 0% minority 
set-aside provision.228 One of the primary obj ectives of the set-aside provision was 
to eliminate barriers to and encourage minority participation in the government 
contracting and procurement prograrn.229 Although there was no direct evidence 
that Congressional legi slation was the source of such barriers, the Court deferred 
to Congress's authority to remedy what it percei ved as a violation of the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.23° For exampl e ,  the Civil 
Rights Commission found several barriers to the entry of minority contractors in the 
government procurement program. 
Among the maj or difficulties confrontin g  minority businesses were 
deficiencies in working capital, i nability to meet bonding 
requirements, disabilities caused by an inadequate 'track record,' 
lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with 
bidding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising 
process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement 
officers to di s favor minority busines s e s .23 1 
These findings and others presented by other governmental agencies, i n cluding the 
General Accounting Office, indicated that minorities were excluded from the 
government procurement program as a result of soci etal discrimination, and not the 
227 Id. at 492. 
228 Fullilove v. Klutnick, 448 U.S.  448, 453 ( 1980), overruled by Adarand C onstructors v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 ( 1 995). One proponent of the bill stated that its purpose was to "direct 
funds into the minority business community, a sector of the economy sorely in need of 
economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with Government procurement 
programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works programs as 
then fonnulated." Id. at 459. 
229 Id. at 473. ("The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by our necessarily 
extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was 
designed to ensure that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1 977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procurement 
practices that Congres s  has decided might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior 
discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public 
contracting opportunities."). 
230 Id. at 472. ("A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, 
calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate 
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 
'provide for the . . .  general welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.") 
231 Id. at 467. 
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exercise of direct Congressional authority . A lthough the Cou� vi�wed Congress 
as a passive participant in this process, i t  concluded that thi s  leg1 slat1on was a valid 
exercise of Congres sional Spending Powers .232 
Congress' s role as a passive part i c ipant in the rac ial segregatio� of the 
broadcasting industry was also apparent in Metro Broadcasll�K · In this case, 
Congress and the FCC attempted to i mpleme n t  race-based incent ive  programs, the 
goal of which was to increase minority part i c ipation in the broadcasti ng _industry.211 
The government' s  principle argument in s upport of the const1 tu� 1 on ahty of the;
1
� 
remedial programs was related to its desi re to foster di versity w 1 th 1� the mdust:y.­
However, Congress and the FCC also noted that they were ac ting to eliminate 
barriers to minority entry in the field that were cau sed by past d i s c ri mination.21) 
Although there were no allegations that g overnment legis lation or conduct were 
232 Fullilove, 448 U.S.  at 473-475. 
Although the Act recites no preambulary " fi ndings " on the subj ect, we arc 
satisfied that Congress had abundant h i storical basis from which it could 
conclude that traditional procuremen t  practices, when applied to minority 
businesses, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. 
Accordingly, Congress reasonably determined that the prospective 
elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to public comracting 
opportunities generated by the 1 977 Act was appropriate to ensure that 
those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in 
federal grants to state and local governments, which is one aspect o f  the 
equal protection of the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the 
actions of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its 
objectives by use of its power under S5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision arc 
within the scope of the Spending Power. 
Id. al 478. 
233 The minority incentive program at issue in Metro Broadcasting had two primary 
components. "First, the Commission pledged to consider minority ownership as one factor 
in comparative proceedings for new licenses . "  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S.  547, 556 
( 1 990). The FCC also "outlined a plan to i ncrease minority opportunities to receive 
reassigned and transferred licenses through the s o-called 'distress sale' policy ." Id. at 557. 
234 
. 
I�. at �66. ("Congr�ss and the Commission do not j ustify the minority ownership 
pohe1es stnetly as remedies for victims of this discrimination, however. Rather, Congress 
and the FCC 
_
have
_ 
selected the minority ownership policies primarily to promote 
pr�gr�mmmg d1versity, and they urge that such diversity is an important governmental obJecllve that can serve as a constitutional basis  for the preference pol ici es . ") 23� �o�gre�s found that "th� effects of past i nequities stemming from racial and ethnic discnnunation have resulted m a severe underrepresentat·on f · · 
· 
· h d. f . . 1 o mmont1es m t  c me 1a o mass commumcat1ons. "  Id. at 566. 
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directly responsible for the past discrimination,236 the Court acknowledged the 
remedial authority utilized by Congress in this  regard pursuant to constitutional 
mandates.237 
When engaging in the legi slative fact-finding process to determine the 
existence of past discrimination or the present effects of any di scriminatory 
practices, the Congressional inquiry must be broader than that undertaken by other 
236 Id. at 553-54. 
Although for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least 
one-fifth of the United States population, during this time relatively few 
members of minority groups have held broadcast licenses. In 1 97 1 ,  
minorities owned only I 0 of the approximately 7,500 radio stations in the 
country and none of the more than 1 ,000 television stations, . . .  in 1 978, 
minorities owned less than 1 percent of the Nation's radio and television 
stations, see FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on Minority 
Ownership in Broadcasting I ( 1 978) (hereinafter Task Force Report); and 
in 1 986, they owned just 2 . 1  percent of the more than 1 1 ,000 radio and 
television stations in the United States.  See National Association of 
Broadcasters, Minority Broadcasting Facts 6 (Sept. 1 986). Moreover, 
these statistics fail to reflect the fact that, as late entrants who o ften have 
been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority 
broadcasters serve geographically limited markets with relatively small 
audiences. 
Id. at 554. 
237 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S.  at 563. 
It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority 
ownership programs have been specifically approved--indeed, 
mandated--by Congress. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448' U.S .  448, J OO 
S.Ct. 275 8, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 ( 1 980), Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
himself and two other Justices, observed that although " [a] program that 
employs racial or ethnic criteria . . .  calls for close examination , "  when a 
program employing a benign racial classification is adopted by an 
admini strative agency at the explicit direction of Congress, we are "bound 
to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a 
co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide 
for the . . .  general Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  (Citations omitted) We explained that deference was 
appropriate in light of Congress' institutional competence as the National 
Legislature, . . .  as well as Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, 
. . .  ;the Spending Clause, . . .  , and the Civil War Amendments. 
Id. at 563 . 
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types of political entities .238 In order to determine if race-bas
.
:� r�n:iedial �ction is 
warranted, Justice Powell in Bakke noted that there must be J Ud1c ial, leg1slat1ve, 
or administrative findings of constitutio n al or statutory violations. "239 Within the 
context of government action, the scope of these findings is dependent on the 
branch of the political entity engaged i n  the inquiry. Congres s ,  as the national 
legislative body, is not bound by the same restric tions that l imit municipalities and 
states to investigate only l ocalized i nstances of discrimination . 240 On the contrary, 
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Court, has g i ven Congress the 
latitude to investig ate and determine whether discrimination e x i s ts on a national 
level. In discussing this issue, Justice Powe l l  argued that " (  t ] hc degree of 
specificity required i n  the findings of di scrimi nation and the breath o f  di scretion in 
the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of the governmental 
238 Appendix-The Compelling Interest for A ffirmati ve Action in Federal Procurement: A 
Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed Reforms to A ffirmative Action in 
Federal Procurement, Fed. Reg., Vol. 6 1 ,  No. 1 0 1  ( 1 996) ( "Furthermore, in combatting (sic) 
discrimination and its effects, Congress has the latitude to develop national remedies for 
national problems . Congress need not make findings of di scrimination with the same degree 
of precision as do state or local governments . Nor is  it obligated to make findings of 
discrimination in every industry or region that may be affected by a remedial measure."). 
239 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 43 8 U.S . 265, 307 ( 1 998). Wygant v.  Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 206 ( 1 986), (O' Connor, J. ,  concurring) ("This remedial purpose 
need not be accompanied b y  contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be 
accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial 
action is required. "). 
2 40  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S . at 565 (Brennan, J.) 
In fact, much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the 
lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by 
Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subj ect to a 
different standard than such classifications prescribed by state and local 
governments. For example, Justice O' Connor, joined by two other 
Members o f  this Court, noted that "Congress may identify and redress the 
effe�ts of soc_
iety-wide discrimination, " and that Congress "need not make 
specific findings of discrimination to engage in race- conscious relief. " 
Echoing Fullilov� 's emphasis on Congress as a National Legislature that 
stands above factional politics, Justice Scalia argued that as a matter of 
"so�ial reality and governmental theory, " the Federal Government is �nhkely to be c�pt�re? b� minority racial or ethnic groups and used as an 
mstrun_ien� o f  ?1scnrrunat10n. Justice Scalia explained that " [t]he s truggle for :actal JUStlc� ha.s historically been a struggle by the national society agamst oppress10� m the indiv��ual S tates, "  because of the "heightened da�g.er of oppression from poht1cal factions in small, rather than large pohtical units . "  ' 
Id. at 565-66. (Citations ommitted). 
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body."241 
The distinction between the scope of Congressional fact-finding, and fact­
finding undertaken by municipalities or states was set forth by Justi c e  O'Connor in 
Croson. She noted that 
Congress has made national findings that there has been s ocietal 
discrimination in a host of fields. If all a state or local government 
need do i s  find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set­
aside program, the constraints of the Equal Protection cause will, 
in effect, have been rendered a nullity.242 
This distinction was apparent in the Court' s analysis of the race-based remedial 
programs at issue i n  Metro Broadcasting, Croson, Fullilove, Wygant, and Adarand. 
In these cases, challenges were made to race-based remedial programs established 
by a governmental entity. Note that in Wygant and Croson the Court rejected the 
factual predicate of past discrimination relied upon by the respecti ve municipalities 
to justify their race-based remedial programs.243 The Court i n  each instance 
241 Fulllove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 5 15 ,  n. 1 4  ( 1 980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, ( 1 995) (Powell, J.,  concurring). 
242 City of Richmond v.  J .A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1 989); Justice Powell, in 
Fullilove discussed the breath of Congress ' s  fact finding authority. He noted that: 
The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply 
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is appropriate to a 
judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no responsibility to 
confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular p arties. 
Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission 
to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to 
the resolution of an issue. One appropriate source is the information and 
expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment of 
earlier legislation. After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of 
national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need 
for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers 
action in that area. 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 . 
243 J .A. Croson Co. ,  488 U.S. at 498. 
We think it clear that the factual predicate offered in support of the 
Richmond Plan suffers from the same two defects identified as fatal in 
Wygant. The District Court found the city council's "findings sufficient 
to ensure that, in adopting the Plan, it was remedying the present effects 
of past discrimination in the construction i ndustry. "  Like the "role model " 
theory employed in Wygant, a generalized assertion that there has been 
280 AKRON LAW REVIEW 
[Vol. 33:2 
determined that the municipalities relied upon generalized findings of 
discrimination that were indicative of broader societal discrimination, and not the 
particularized finds of discrimination required to overcome the constitutional 
invalidity of racial classifications.244 Although other equal protection challenges 
were raised, the Congressionally mandated findings of past discrimination were all 
upheld in the remaining cases due to the Court ' s  recognition of Congress' s authority 
to engage in national fact-finding. 
A Congressional inquiry into the exi s tence of discrimination or the present 
effects of past d i scrimination within the educational arena would not be 
unprecedented.245 Congress, the Department of Justice, the Small Business 
Administration, and additional governmental agencies engaged in a coordinated 
effort to examine the government procurement and contracting program following 
Adarand.246 The purpose of this investig ation was to establish a factual predicate 
for the continued implementation of race-based contract decision that would satisfy 
the strict scrutiny analysis mandated by Adarand. 
In developing a strategic plan for Congressional review of the existence of 
discrimination or the present effects of p a s t  d iscrimination within the educational 
arena, several factors must be considered .  As indicated in Section IV .B.1.  above, 
Id. 
past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a 
legislative body to determine the preci se scope of the injury it seeks to 
remedy. It "has no logical stopping point. " " Relief" for such an 
ill-defined wrong could extend unti l  the percentage of public contracts 
awarded to MBE's in Richmond mirrored the percentage of minorities in 
the population as a whole. 
244 Id. at 49 1 . (citing Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. City of San Francisco, 8 1 3  F.2d 922 929 (9'b C 1 987)) ("Th ·
 · · 
· 
• . . rr. e ctty is not JUSt hkc the federal government with regard to the findings it must make to justify race-conscious remedial action ") 
245 In 1 964 Pre · · . . 
· · 
. 
. 
• . . sident Lyndon B .. Johnson 1mtiated a national dialogue on the soc1
0-
econo�c cond1tmn of poor Amencans. Pinned as the "War on Poverty ' government 
ag
b
cncies, economi.c advisors, and Congress w orked together to identi fy pr�blems such as su -standard housmg educaf h I h 
f th 1 . 
' IOn, ea t care, and unemployment that plagued this segment 
a
o
nd s
e
t 
p
d
�pu atm
h
�· Aft�r numerous Congres s ional h earings, and the submission of reports 
u Ies on t IS subject Congr d h . . 
establ. h d b 
' ess passe t c Econorruc Opportunity Act of 1 964 which 
IS e a num er of programs d . d " . . 
opportunities for work for educ 
. es1gnc t.o . ehmmat[c] poverty by giving all Americans 
dignI·ty "' Lo . L ct' 
atlon and trammg and for the chance to l i ve in 'decency and 
· utse an er ed War p 246 s 
. . . ' ·· on overty, 2 1  (Facts on File Inc 1 967) 
ee, mqmry mto contracting industr A · 
' · 
Action in Federal p 
y, ppendi x-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative 
rocurement· A Prelimi S 
Reforms to Affirmative Actio 
·. F d 
nary urvey, Department of Justice, Proposed 
n m  e eral Procurement, 6 1  Fed.Reg. ,  1 0 1 ( 1 996). 
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there must be a "strong basis in evidence"247 for concluding that race-based 
affirmative action is the appropriate remedy. Further, such evidence cannot broadly 
sweep across every segment of American society searching for generalized findings 
of discrimination against racial and ethnic minority groups.248 On the contrary, to 
establish that Congress has a compelling interest in remedying discrimination within 
the educational community, the Congressional investigation must be l imited in a 
number of way s .  
a. Time frame 
First, an appropriate time frame must be established for determining the 
existence of discrimination within this context .  Although the process of judicial 
dismantling of segregated educational institutions began with Brown, many judicial 
and legislati ve hurdles,  including the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
I 964, followed that h istoric decision. 249 Any attempts to determine when wholesale 
247 J .A. Croson Co. , 488 U. S .  at 500. 248 See, inquiry into contracting industry Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative 
Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed 
Reforms to Affirmati ve Action in Federal Procurement. 61  Fed.Reg. 1 0 1 , May 23, 1 996, at 
26042, 2605 1 .  ("In evaluating the evidentiary predicate for affirmative action in federal 
procurement, it is highly s ignificant that the measures have been authorized by Congress, 
which has the unique and express constitutional power to pass laws to ensure the fulfillment 
of the guarantees of racial equality in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. These 
explicit constitutional commands vest Congress with the authority to remedy discrimination 
by private actors as well as state and local governments. Congress may also exercise its 
constitutionally grounded spending and commerce powers to ensure that discrimination in 
our nation is not inadvertently perpetuated through government procurement practices. In 
exercising its remedial authority, Congress need not target only deliberate acts of 
discrimination. It may also strive to eliminate the effects of discrimination that continue to 
impair opportunity for minorities, even in  the absence of ongoing, intentional acts of 
discrimination.");See also, Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One 
Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests, 
April 23, 1 987, Serial No. 9 3 .  
m s  B ee also, STEPHAN THERNSTROM AND ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN LACK AND 
WHITE I 05 ( 1 997) .  
Brown I stated the principle; Brown I/ was a guide to implementation, and 
it sent a signal of extreme patience and considerable flexibility. To begin 
with, the task of determining what desegregation remedy was appropriate 
in each community and of setting a realistic timetable for implementing 
that remedy was left to local federal district judges. As a result, 
individual black parents had to bring complaints on a case-by-case basis 
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de j ure segregation ended must realistically. ackno�ledge that this �as .
a �adual 
process that occurred over a significant pe�od. 
of tI":ie .  However, d1scmmnat?ry 
patterns and practices that are too remote m ume will not serve as a compellmg 
justification for the use of race-based remedial .mea�ures.250. Unf�rt�nately.' there 
i s  no magic formula for determining an appropnate time penod. L1m1te� gm�a�ce 
may be found by examining the time periods uti l ize d  by Congress m s1m1lar 
inquiries.25 1  
b. Scope of Congressional inquiry 
As discussed in Section IV .A. above, a Congressional inquiry into the 
systemic pol icies, patterns, and practices of educational institutions must 
Id. 
when local authorities were indi fferent to the law. In the course of the 
prolonged struggle that followed, the NAACP had to assume the burden 
of initiating desegregation suits in more than two thousand southern 
school districts. 
In addition, the Court ordered districts operating single-race 
schools lo proceed toward dismantling their dual school systems 'with all 
deliberate speed.' ' With . . .  speed' would seem to have meant 
expeditiously, hut in fact the permission to proceed al a ' deliberate' pace 
was the more important message. In the Border states, where black 
population concentrations were smaller and the caste system was not as 
rigidly enforced, desegregation did proceed with some dispatch and little 
conllii.:l. But in the eleven ex-Confederate states 'deliberate' meant not 
slow hut stop. There, a ful l decade after Brown, a mere 1 .2 percent of 
hlack puhlic school students attended schools that had any while pupils 
al al l .  Desegregation, one observer remarked, was proceeding with 'the 
pai.:e of an ex traordinary arthritic snail.' 
1"' Id. Middleton v .  City of Flint. 92 F.3d 396, 409 (6'h Cir. 1 996). ("Furthermore, as this 
court has noted previously, evidence of past discrimination that is remote in time will  not 
support a claimof i.:ompclling governmental interest when other evidence is adduced to show 
that the governmental hody has taken serious steps in  subsequent years Lo reverse the e ffects 
of past discrimination and to implement appropriate new standards. Thus in Brunet v. City 
of Columh11s. I F.3d 390 (6'h Cir .  1 993) .  we held that strong evidence proffered in J 989 that 
a city fire department had discriminated prior to 1975 "is too remote to support a compel l i ng 
governmental interest to justify the affirmative action plan, "especially in light of evidence 
that the city had suhsequently taken steps to improve its recruitment efforts.") 
: • :  S('('. i nquiry i nto contracting industry in which they examined Congressional findings for 
a twenty-six period from 1 980 through 1 996. Appendix-The Compelling Interes t  for 
A ffinnati ve Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice,  
Proposed Rcfonns to A ffirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 6 1  Fed. Reg. No. 1 0 1  
( 1 99 tl )  
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specifically identify evidence of discrimination or the present effects of past racial 
discrimination. As Justice O' Connor determined in Croson: 
Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the 
scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to c ure 
its effects. Such findings also serve to assure all citizens that the 
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic 
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the 
goal of equality itself. Absent such findings, there is a danger that 
a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking 
stereotypes or a forrn of racial poli tics .  ' [I]f there is no duty to 
attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to distribute 
that recovery within the inj ured class in an evenhanded way, our 
history will adequately support a l egi s l ative preference for almost 
any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength to 
negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members. ' 252 
Pursuant to the provisions of Title VI, educational institutions, both public 
and private, that receive federal funds are prohibited from engaging in racially 
discriminatory conduct.253 The focus of the inquiry will include not only 
Congressional actions, but on the actions of institutions of higher education 
governed by the provisions of Title VI because of their receipt of federal funds. 
The data assembled for this inquiry may focus on a number of disputed areas that 
fall within the scope of Title VI. There must, however, be a recognitio n  that there 
are two somewhat distinct areas within the educational field - students and faculty. 
One area of inquiry may focu s  on the existence of discrimination relating to faculty 
hiring, retention, and promotion.254 Also included in the Congressional inquiry 
252 J .A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S.,  at 510- l l .  
253 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 provides that " [n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C §2000d. 
254 See generally, Edgar G. Epps, Affirmative Action and Minority Access to Faculty 
Positions, 59 OHIO STATE L. J. 755 ( 1 998); Deborah Jones Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, 
Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth about Affirmative Action in the Law Faculty Hiring, 
97 COLUM.L.REv. 1 99 ( 1 997); Caroline Sootello Viernes Turner and Samuel L. Myers, Jr., 
Faculty Diversity and Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TEST AMENT OF HOPE: 
STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 3 1  (Mildred Garcia ed., 1 997) ; 
Deborah J. Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a 
Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S .CAL. L. REV. 29 ( 1 992). 
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would be the equal ly important  issues re lated to student admissions and retent ion . �55 
As the following indicates, a n umber of h igh ly d i sputed areas cou ld be inc luded 
within the scope of student related i ssues:  
• 
Cultural, racial or ethnic b i as on standardi zed tests250 such as the 
PSAT, SAT, ACT, LSAT, GRE, and MCAT2'\7 
Reliance on the accuracy of numerical pred i ctors such as grade 
point averages and standardized test scores2'\H 
255 See generally, Deborah Jones Merritt, Symposium: Twenrv Years A.ficr Bakke: The Ui11 
and Social Science of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 59 01 110 ST. L.J . I 055 ( 1 99K) :  
Whv a Nationwide Ban on Race-Conscious Admissions Will Sha rp/_,. Curtail Black 
En;ol/ments as the Nation 's Highest-Ranked Medical Schools, 23 JOCR'.'\AL OF B LACKS I\ 
HIGHER EDUCATION 22 (Spring 1 999); William G. Bowen and Derck Bok, The Shape of the 
River: Long-term Consequences on Considering Race in College and Un i1·ersiry Admissions 
(Princeton University Press 1 998); SUSAN WELCH AND JOHN GRuHL, A1-1:1R :vt ATIVE i\CTIO\ 
AND MINORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS ( 1 998) ;  LI:\ IM F. W IGI 1n1A\. 
STANDARDIZED TESTING AND EQUAL ACCESS :  A TuTORIAL, CHAPTER 4, I:\ C0\1PELI.l\G 
INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACtAL DYNAMICS ll'\ H IGHER EDl.:CATIO\. 
Prepublication Draft Advance Copy, A Report of the AERA Panel on Racial Dynamics in 
Colleges and Universities (Mitchell Chang, Daria Wilt, James Jones, Kcnji Hakuta, eds., 
1 999)(0n file with the author); ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND 1 36-37 ( 1 997);  Theodore Cross 
and Robert Bruce Slater, Special Report: Why the End of Affirmative Action Would Exclude 
All But a Very Few B lacks form America 's Leading Universities and Graduate Schools, J .  
O F  B LACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., September 30, 1 997' at 8 .  
256 For discussions o f  racial and cultural bias, s e e  generally STEPHAN THERNSTR0\1 ASD 
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 348-422 ( 1 997);  CHRISTOPHER 
JENCKS AND MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP ( 1 99 8) ;  CHILLl:\G 
ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (Gary 
Orfield and Edward Miller, eds., 1 998); Roberto Rodriguez, Test-Driven A dmissions: ETS 
Responds to Criticism of SATs, Black Issues in Higher Education, September 5, 1 996, at 7;  
Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J.  GENDER & L. 1 2 1  ( 1 993) . 
257 The Pre-Scholastic Aptitude Test(PSA T), S cholastic Aptitude Test( S AT), Graduate 
Record Examination(GRE), Medical College Admissions Test(MCAT) are administered by 
Educational Testing Services .  The ACT Assessment is administered by American College 
Testing, Law Services administers the Law School Admissions Test (LSA T).  
258 See generally, Nicholas Lernann, Behind the SAT, Book Expert, Adapted from " The Big 
Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy, " September 6, 1 999 at 52; A 
Measurement of What? Although 'Reliably Constant, ' Experts Say Standardized Test Scores 
Are Often Misunderstood, B lack Issues in Higher Education, September 4, 1 997, at 1 8 ; 
Susan Strum and Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative 
Ideal, 84 CALIFORNtA L. REV. 953, 957 ( 1 996). ("Typical among the existing criteria and 
selection methods are paper-and-pencil tests, such as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT), 
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Access to public and private sources of financial assistance 
Access to academic counse l ors and preparatory assistance 
Bias in the de velopment, admi nistration, and impl ementation of 
admissions pol icies259 
Under-representation of rac i al and ethnic minorities m certain 
professional fields of study 
For example, the controversy surrounding continued use of standardized 
admissions tests has not escaped Congressional scrutiny.260 In May, 1 999, the 
Office of Civil Rights ( "OCR") of the U.S.  Department of Education distributed a 
draft version of a guidebook entitled "Nondi scrimination in High-Stakes Testing: 
A Resource Guide."261 Thi s  guidebook provides educational institutions with a 
framework to insure that their use of standardized admi ssions tests c onform with the 
anti-discrimination mandate s  of Title VI of the Civil  Rights Act of 1 964. The 
guidebook provides, in pertinent part, that "the use of any educati onal test which 
has a significant di sparate impact on members of any particular race, national 
origin, or sex is discriminatory ."262 This initial draft guidebook required 
educational institutions to j ustify their use of standardized admissions tests as 
"educationally necessary," and further provided that the instituti ons e stablish that 
no "practical alternative" for increasing the number of racial minorities and women 
was available.263 The Department of Education received considerable criticism 
the Law School Admissions Test (LSA T), and civil service exams. These tests, which are 
used to predict future performance based on existing capacity or ability, do not correlate with 
future performance for most applicants, at least not as a method of ranking those 'most 
qualified. ' These tests and informal criteria making up our 'meritocracy' tell us more about 
past opportunity than about future accomplishments on the job or in the classroom."). 
259 s eegenerally, SYLVIA HURTADO ANDCHRISTINE NAVIA, RECONCILING COLLEGEACCESS 
AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE, !N AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: 
STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 05 ( 1 997). 
260 See Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests: Oversight Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House 
of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and Race Differences 
on Standardized Tests, April 23, 1 987, Serial No. 93.  
261 Amy Dockser Marcus, Standardized Test Guide Could Lead to Lawsuits, WALL STREET 
J., May 5, 26, 1 999, at A2. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
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from Congress, testing services, and educational institutions re�arding th� proposed 
guidelines.264 In response to concerns rai se d  during �ongress�on�l hean��s on the 
matter, the Department of Education agreed to modify the gm dehnes to confonn 
to existing law. 11265 Although this issue appears resolve� at t�e ��ment, unresolved 
questions remain about the exclusion of racial and ethmc mmonlles from access to 
avenues of higher education. 
2.  Narrow tail oring 
As discussed in Section IV .B . 1 .  above, Congress must initially find 
evidence of either past discrimination or the present effects of past discrimination 
in the field of higher education. Such a fi nding would support a finding of a 
compelling state interest sufficient to j ustify the facial as we11 as applied use of 
race-based remedies.  Thereafter, the federal entity charged with developing a race­
based remedial affirmative action program would be responsible for insuring that 
the scope of the remedy be narrowly tailore d  to specifically address the problems 
identified by the Congressional finding s .266 S upreme C ourt precedent does offer 
264 Patrick Healy, Education Dept. Official tells Congress Guidelines on Testing Won't 
Burden Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ., July 2 ,  1 999 at A30; Jeffrey Sclingo, Colleges urge 
civil-rights office to revise guidelines on testing, Chron. Higher Educ. ,  July 23, 1999, at 
A58. 
265 In her testimony on June 22, 1 999, before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, Norma V. Cantu', Assistant Sec�et_ary for Civil Rights, stated that " [ w ]e will make the language clear to con�onn to ex1stmg law . . .  yes, the language will change . "  S tatement o f  Norma v. Cantu', Ass1s�nt _Secretary for Civil Rights, Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigati
_
ons of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, June 22, 1999. After re_ce�pt of comments :rom interested educators, testing services, and the public, the OCR w1ll 1ssue a final version of the guidebook in Fall 1 999 266 R th D 1 , . 0 e eve opment Corp. v. US DOD, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W. D .  Texas 1 999). The three post-Adarand cases that h ave addressed the question of whether th� federal . 
government's SBA-ba s ed remedial program was narrowly tailored to tts purpose ha -ve unanimously agreed that it is not Each of these courts held how h 
· 
. 
. 
• ever, t at the Government had a compelling 
�urpose �0. actmg. The Court is troubled by the implicit s uggestion in ese op1ruons that while the fed 1 deference than st 1 '  d 1 
era government may be given more a e an ocal governme t . . I - . purpose for rem d' 1 . . 
n s m art1cu atmg a compelling e ia action It must no th I b . . standards set forth . C 
'
 
n
. 
c e ess c ng1dly held to the m roson a cas . I . municipality, i f  it is to show th�t 
. � m_vo vmg the actions of a 
purpose If Con . 
Its acLion is narrowly tailored to that . gress is to be allo wed a b d . 
. problems, it seems only lo . cal t 
· 
. roa V1S1on o f  the nation's gi hat H be allowed some measure of 
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guidance in this area. In United States v. Paradise,267 the Court developed a set of 
objectives that must be c onsidered when evaluating whether racial classifi cations 
are narrowly tailored enough to overcome the strict scrutiny of the equal protection 
paradigm. In Paradise, Justice Brennan articulated the following n arrow tailoring 
standard: 
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, 
we look to several factors, including the necessity for the relief and 
the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of 
the relief, incl uding the availability or waiver provision s ;  the 
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; 
and the impact of the relief on the rights o f  third parties.268 
The notion that strict scrutiny is "fatal in fact" is never more apparent than 
when searching for a race-based remedial program 
capable of withstanding the challenge that the program does not conform to the 
narrow tailoring component of the equal protection paradigm. However, until such 
time as Congressional findings indicate that present effects of past d i scrimination 
continue to impact the field of higher education, a thorough discussion of ways in 
which a program might be narrowly tailored i s  premature. 
V .  CONCLUSION 
At this j uncture in the evolution of the Equal Protection Clause the Court 
finds itself at an impasse.  Although the application of the strict scrutiny test fosters 
a sense that the constitution is a racially neutral document, thi s  i nterpretation 
remains in opposition to the realities of the American social and political 
deference in addressing those problems. In other words, there must be 
some relationship between the breadth of the problem to be remedied and 
the breadth of the remedy to be allowed. Strict application of the Croson 
criteria, without consideration of Congress's role in addressing i ssues that 
face the nation as a whole, will almost inevitably result in the invalidation 
of congressional remedial measures. Such automatic invalidation would 
render strict s crutiny "strict in theory; fatal in fact," a result that the 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected. 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S.  200, 237 ( 1 995); See also, Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 
17 F.Supp.2d 1 026 (D. Minn. 1998); Cortez III Service Corp. v. NASA, 950 F.Supp. 357 
(D.D.C. 1996);  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 964 F.Supp. 1 556 ( 1 997),judgment vacated 
and remanded with directions to dismiss, 1 63 F.3d 1 292 (1 Olh Cir. 1 999). 
267 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 987). 
26
8 Id. at 17 1 . 
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framework. Questions remain regarding whether there is a causal l ink between the 
continuing effects of discrimination and the minimal number of racial and ethnic 
minorities enrolled in institutions of higher education. In addition, the ability of 
pubic and private actors to implement race-based remedial measures remains a 
constitutional mystery. While we wait for that "perfect" affirmative action test case 
to work its way u p  to the Supreme Court, the v iability of race -based affirmative 
action programs i s  questionable. Unfortun ate l y ,  we have run out of time and can 
no longer wait for a j udicial solution when equal ly viable avenues of relief are 
available. 
That this i s  an issue of national importance is not subj ect to dispute. It is 
the very nature of this national issue which c al l s  for a remedial solution that is both 
national in scope and mandated by the prov i s i ons of the constitution. Treating the 
question of the viability of race-based affirrnati ve action programs as a political, not 
solely judicial issue i s  one important step toward finding an overarching, expedient 
remedy that could exist within the constitutionally permissible parameters of the 
strict scrutiny analysis .  
